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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance

Armstrong, Christopher S., Blouin, Jennifer L., Jagolinzer, Alan D., Larcker, David F.·2015·Journal of Accounting and Economics

Abstract

We examine the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and corporate tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities that involve risky expected cash flows, unresolved agency problems may lead managers to engage in more or less corporate tax avoidance than shareholders would otherwise prefer. Consistent with the mixed results reported in prior studies, we find no relation between various corporate governance mechanisms and tax avoidance at the conditional mean and median of the tax avoidance distribution. However, using quantile regression, we find a positive relation between board independence and financial sophistication for low levels of tax avoidance, but a negative relation for high levels of tax avoidance. These results indicate that these governance attributes have a stronger relation with more extreme levels of tax avoidance, which are more likely to be symptomatic of over- and under-investment by managers.

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Metadata

Authors
Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., Jagolinzer, A. D., & Larcker, D. F.
Venue
Journal of Accounting and Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2015-08
Volume
60
Issue
1
Pages
1-17
ISSN
0165-4101 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3122286732
Cited by
1,064
References
57
FWCI
201.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.003
The paper
Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., Jagolinzer, A. D., & Larcker, D. F. (2015). Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.003

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.