The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance
Abstract
We examine the link between corporate governance, managerial incentives, and corporate tax avoidance. Similar to other investment opportunities that involve risky expected cash flows, unresolved agency problems may lead managers to engage in more or less corporate tax avoidance than shareholders would otherwise prefer. Consistent with the mixed results reported in prior studies, we find no relation between various corporate governance mechanisms and tax avoidance at the conditional mean and median of the tax avoidance distribution. However, using quantile regression, we find a positive relation between board independence and financial sophistication for low levels of tax avoidance, but a negative relation for high levels of tax avoidance. These results indicate that these governance attributes have a stronger relation with more extreme levels of tax avoidance, which are more likely to be symptomatic of over- and under-investment by managers.
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Cites
Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion
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Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
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Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference
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Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives
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Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance
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Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?
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Incorrect Inferences When Using Residuals as Dependent Variables
CHEN, W., HRIBAR, P., & MELESSA, S. (2018) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12195 · Cited by 701
The Effect of Corporate Tax Avoidance on the Cost of Equity
Goh, B. W., Lee, J., Lim, C. Y., & Shevlin, T. J. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2237742 · Cited by 422
Influential Observations and Inference in Accounting Research
Leone, A. J., Minutti-Meza, M., & Wasley, C. E. (2019) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-52396 · Cited by 377
Perspectives on Corporate Tax Planning: Observations from the Past Decade
Wilde, J. H., & Wilson, R. J. (2018) · The Journal of the American Taxation Association · doi:10.2308/atax-51993 · Cited by 342
Wilde, J. H. (2017) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51661 · Cited by 316
Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., Jagolinzer, A. D., & Larcker, D. F.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-08
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-17
- ISSN
- 0165-4101 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122286732
- Cited by
- 1,064
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 201.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., Jagolinzer, A. D., & Larcker, D. F. (2015). Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance. Journal of Accounting and Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.02.003
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.