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Corporate Governance and Equity Prices

Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A. · 2003 · The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

Shareholder rights vary across firms. Using the incidence of 24 unique governance rules, we construct a "Governance Index" to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. We find that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1162/00335530360535162

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Citations

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Show all 52 references

Research works printed but not linked: 16

  1. Banz Rolf, 1981, Journal of Financial Economics, 296
  2. Baysinger Barry D, 1985, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 101
  3. Coates John, 2000, Texas Law Review, 271
  4. 2000, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 477
  5. Garvey Gerald T, 1999, Journal of Finance, 546
  6. Ishii, Joy L. "Corporate Governance in the 1990s: New Evidence on the Role of Shareholder Proposals," Senior Honors Thesis, Harvard University, 2000.
  7. Jensen Michael, 1986, American Economic Review, 323
  8. Johnson Mark S, 1997, Financial Review, 690
  9. Kaplan Steven N, 1997, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 216
  10. Lambert Richard A, 1985, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 203
  11. Lewellen Wilbur, 1985, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 231
  12. Meulbroek Lisa K, 1990, Journal of Political Economy, 1117
  13. Michaely Roni, 1995, Journal of Finance, 1597
  14. Rosenbaum Virginia, 1993, Investor Responsibility Research Center Inc., 1990, 1995
  15. Shin Hyun-Han, 2000, NBER Working Paper No., 7808
  16. Williamson, Oliver, The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964).

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Metadata

Authors
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A.
Affiliations
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
2003-02-01
Volume
118
Issue
1
Pages
107-156
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W4233420185
Cited by
6,120
References
52
Citations by year
2026: 222 · 2025: 320 · 2024: 281 · 2023: 284 · 2022: 330 · 2021: 287 · 2020: 333 · 2019: 319 · 2018: 318 · 2017: 337 · 2016: 306 · 2015: 309 · 2014: 341 · 2013: 299 · 2012: 321
FWCI
362.08
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
Keywords
corporate governance, shareholder rights, stock prices, governance indicators, abnormal returns, firm value, corporate acquisition, capital expenditure, sales growth

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/00335530360535162
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Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530360535162

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.