The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review
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A key insight from extant research in accounting is that disclosure can change a firm's investment behavior and other real activities.
“A key insight from extant research in accounting is that disclosure can change a firm’s investment behavior and other real activities (for overviews see Leuz and Wysocki 2016; Roychowdhury et al. 2019).”
From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Roychowdhury et al. 2019
Cites
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957 · see citing works
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769 · see citing works
Dixit, R. K., & Pindyck, R. S. (1994) · doi:10.1515/9781400830176 · Cited by 9,029 · see citing works
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836 · see citing works
How does financial reporting quality relate to investment efficiency?
Biddle, G. C., Hilary, G., & Verdi, R. S. (2009) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.09.001 · Cited by 3,214 · see citing works
Self-citationAccounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
LAMBERT, R., LEUZ, C., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (2007) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00238.x · Cited by 2,586 · see citing works
Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership
AZAR, J., SCHMALZ, M. C., & TECU, I. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12698 · Cited by 980 · cited 1× · see citing works
“55 In fact, a rapidly growing body of research finds that when a firm’s investors simultaneously own significant stakes in its competitors, managers are incentivized to reduce investment, increase disclosure and become less competitive (e.g., He and Huang, 2017; Azar et al., 2018; Park et al., 2019).”
BackgroundChristensen, H. B., Floyd, E., Liu, L. Y., & Maffett, M. (2017) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.08.001 · Cited by 547 · see citing works
Segment Profitability and the Proprietary and Agency Costs of Disclosure
Berger, P. G., & Hann, R. N. (2007) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2007.82.4.869 · Cited by 467 · cited 1× · see citing works
“19 Underlying the analysis in Hope and Thomas (2008) is the idea that following SFAS 131, managers withhold information on segments with lower profitability due to agency incentives (Berger and Hann, 2007).”
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Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2021) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-021-09609-5 · Cited by 1,923 · see citing works
Mandated Financial Reporting and Corporate Innovation
Breuer, M., Leuz, C., & Vanhaverbeke, S. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3449813 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
- Authors
- Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. S.
- Affiliations
- Boston College (US)
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Shroff, Nemit
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2019-11
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 2-3
- Pages
- 101246
- ISSN
- 0165-4101 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2951991237
- Cited by
- 749
- References
- 9
- Citations by year
- 2026: 97 · 2025: 147 · 2024: 131 · 2023: 136 · 2022: 90 · 2021: 49 · 2020: 51 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 3 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 134.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of Accounting and Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting
- Keywords
- financial reporting, disclosure, corporate investment, capital allocation, investment decision-making, information asymmetry, capital budgeting
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