The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU
Open accessAbstract
Fiscal rules, such as the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), aim at constraining government behavior. Milesi-Ferretti (2003) develops a model in which governments circumvent such rules by reverting to creative accounting. The amount of this depends on the reputation cost for the government and the economic cost of sticking to the rule. We provide empirical evidence of creative accounting in the European Union. We find that the SGP rules have induced governments to use stock-flow adjustments, a form of creative accounting, to hide deficits. The tendency to substitute stock-flow adjustments for budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit, as in times of recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large.
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Cites
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Poterba, J. M. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261955 · Cited by 1,099
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Self-citationBalanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states
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Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting
Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2004) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(02)00076-2 · Cited by 366
Interest rate reaction functions for the euro area: Evidence from panel data analysis
Ruth, K. (2006) · Empirical Economics · doi:10.1007/s00181-006-0117-y · Cited by 53
Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game
Tapking, J. (2005) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.006 · Cited by 44
Cited by
Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x · Cited by 548
Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i-Casals, J., & Kumar, M. S. (2008) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2008.00199.x · Cited by 477
Hallerberg, M., Rainer Strauch, R., & von Hagen, J. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511759505 · Cited by 405
Self-citationHow much should we trust the dictator’s GDP growth estimates?
Martínez, L. R. (2022) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/720458 · Cited by 228
Metadata
- Authors
- von Hagen, J., & Wolff, G. B.
- Venue
- Journal of Banking & Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 3259-3279
- ISSN
- 0378-4266 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124395498
- Cited by
- 302
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 19.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- von Hagen, J., & Wolff, G. B. (2006). What do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU. Journal of Banking & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.05.011
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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