The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How bank capital buffers vary across countries: The influence of cost of deposits, market power and bank regulation
Open accessAbstract
Abstract This paper analyzes the bank and country determinants of capital buffers using a panel data of 1337 banks in 70 countries between 1992 and 2002. After controlling for adjustment costs and the endogeneity of explanatory variables, the results show that capital buffers are positively related to the cost of deposits and bank market power, although the relations vary across countries depending on regulation, supervision, and institutions. Their impact is the result of two generally opposing effects: restrictions on bank activities and official supervision reduce the incentives to hold capital buffers by weakening market discipline, but at the same time they promote higher capital buffers by increasing market power. Institutional quality has the two opposite effects. Better accounting disclosure and less generous deposit insurance, however, have a clear positive effect on capital buffers by both strengthening market discipline and making charter value better able to reduce risk-taking incentives.
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Cites
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Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?
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Microeconomics of BankingPreprint
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Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
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Cited by
Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all?
Klomp, J., & Haan, J. D. (2012) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.10.006 · Cited by 291
Metadata
- Authors
- Fonseca, A. R., & González, F.
- Venue
- Journal of Banking & Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-04
- Volume
- 34
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 892-902
- ISSN
- 0378-4266 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1995599789
- Cited by
- 253
- References
- 45
- FWCI
- 20.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Fonseca, A. R., & González, F. (2010). How bank capital buffers vary across countries: The influence of cost of deposits, market power and bank regulation. Journal of Banking & Finance. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.09.020
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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