Cited by 18,025Corporate Finance and GovernanceLaw, Economics, and Judicial SystemsCorporate Governance and Law

Law and finance

La Porta, Rafael, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny, Robert W.·1998·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common‐law countries generally have the strongest, and frenchcivillaw countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German‐and scandinavin‐civil‐law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negativelyrelated to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified share‐holders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.

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Crossref · 10.1086/250042

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37 of 37 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Common law countries have a higher antidirector rights index (4.00) than French civil law (2.33), German civil law (2.33), Scandinavian civil law (3.00), and the world average (3.00).

    “Antidirector rights index 4.00 2.33 2.33 3.00 3.00”

    From Investor protection and corporate governance (2000) · cites this paper as La Porta et al. (1998)

  • Common law countries have a higher creditor rights index (3.11) than French civil law (1.58), German civil law (2.33), Scandinavian civil law (2.00), and the world average (2.30).

    “Creditor rights index 3.11 1.58 2.33 2.00 2.30”

    From Investor protection and corporate governance (2000) · cites this paper as La Porta et al. (1998)

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Authors
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • University of Chicago (US)
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
1998-12
Volume
106
Issue
6
Pages
1113-1155
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W3121759882
Cited by
18,025
References
37
Citations by year
2026: 706 · 2025: 720 · 2024: 614 · 2023: 606 · 2022: 607 · 2021: 665 · 2020: 712 · 2019: 760 · 2018: 754 · 2017: 718 · 2016: 722 · 2015: 773 · 2014: 875 · 2013: 859 · 2012: 927
FWCI
722.18
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Law
Keywords
investor protection, shareholder rights, creditor protection, common law, civil law, legal origins, rule of law, ownership concentration, corporate governance, cross-national comparison

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