Political connections, internal control and firm value: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Cites
Faccio, M. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806776157704 · Cited by 4,059
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118354 · Cited by 3,336 · cited 1×
“…politicians extract rents from companies, and they eventually hamper the firm value and performance (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2006; Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008; Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Li, Xia, Yu, & Zhang, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).”
FAN, J., WONG, T., & ZHANG, T. (2007) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.008 · Cited by 2,725
Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts
FACCIO, M., MASULIS, R. W., & McCONNELL, J. J. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01000.x · Cited by 2,561
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097524 · Cited by 2,366
Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms
Li, H., Meng, L., Wang, Q., & Zhou, L.-A. (2008) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.03.001 · Cited by 1,791
Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.003 · Cited by 1,724
Cronyism and capital controls: evidence from Malaysia
Johnson, S., & Mitton, T. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00255-6 · Cited by 1,565 · cited 2×
“…advantages, including bank loans, tax breaks, government subsidies, direct contracts and regulation favors (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; Faccio, 2002; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; among others), but also enhance firms' value and accounting performance (Faccio, 2006; Feng, Johansson, & Zhang, 2015;…”
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting
Doyle, J. T., Ge, W., & McVay, S. (2007) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2007.82.5.1141 · Cited by 1,366
The effects of government ownership on bank lending
Sapienza, P. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2002.10.002 · Cited by 1,363
Metadata
- Authors
- Wang, F., Xu, L., Zhang, J., & Shu, W.
- Venue
- Journal of Business Research
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-05
- Volume
- 86
- Pages
- 53-67
- ISSN
- 0148-2963 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2789426538
- Cited by
- 203
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 25.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Political connections, internal control and firm value: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.01.045
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- Wang, F., Xu, L., Zhang, J., & Shu, W. (2018). Political connections, internal control and firm value: Evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign. Journal of Business Research. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.01.045
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.