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Cited by 3,336

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Politicians and Firms

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Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W.·1994·The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Abstract

We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model. We use the model and several extensions to understand why commercialization and privatization might work, and what forces contribute to effective restructuring of public enterprises. We illustrate the model using examples from several countries.

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Metadata

Authors
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Published
1994-11-01
Volume
109
Issue
4
Pages
995-1025
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
OpenAlex
W2030132760
Cited by
3,336
References
0
FWCI
93.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Politicians and Firms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2118354
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Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1994). Politicians and Firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118354

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.