The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Market mechanisms and funding dynamics in equity crowdfunding
Open accessAbstract
Equity crowdfunding is a new form of entrepreneurial finance, in which investors do not receive perks or engage in pre-purchase of the product, but rather participate in the future cash flows of a firm. In this paper, we analyze what determines individual investment decisions in this new financial market. One important factor that may influence the behavior of investors is the way the portal allocates securities. We use unique data from four German equity crowdfunding portals to examine how the allocation mechanism affects funding dynamics. In contrast with the crowdfunding campaigns on Kickstarter, on which the typical pattern of project support is U shaped, we find that equity crowdfunding dynamics are L shaped under a first-come, first-served mechanism and U shaped under a second-price auction. The evidence also shows that investors base their decisions on information provided by the entrepreneur in the form of updates as well as by the investment behavior and comments of other crowd investors.
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Citations
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Cited by
The emergence of the global fintech market: economic and technological determinants
Haddad, C., & Hornuf, L. (2019) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-018-9991-x · Cited by 754
Self-citationSustainability, FinTech and Financial Inclusion
Arner, D. W., Buckley, R. P., Zetzsche, D. A., & Veidt, R. (2020) · European Business Organization Law Review · doi:10.1007/s40804-020-00183-y · Cited by 730
Crowdfunding Creative Ideas: The Dynamics of Project Backers
Kuppuswamy, V., & Bayus, B. L. (2018) · The Economics of Crowdfunding · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66119-3_8 · Cited by 310
Metadata
- Authors
- Hornuf, L., & Schwienbacher, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Corporate Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2018-06
- Volume
- 50
- Pages
- 556-574
- ISSN
- 0929-1199 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123289970
- Cited by
- 361
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 57.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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