The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
Abstract
We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding rivals’ drop-out prices. Although both auctions have the same normal form representation, bidding is much closer to equilibrium in the ascending price auctions. We explore the behavioral process underlying these differences along with dynamic Vickrey auctions designed to eliminate the inefficiencies resulting from demand reduction in the uniform price auctions. Key words: multi-unit demand auctions, uniform price auction, dynamic Vickrey auction, demand reduction, experiment.
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Cites
The Handbook of experimental economics
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-1645 · Cited by 3,679
The Handbook of Experimental Economics
(1995) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691213255 · Cited by 2,051
Camerer, C. (2020) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvzsmff5.12 · Cited by 992
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
Ausubel, L. M., Cramton, P., Pycia, M., Rostek, M., & Weretka, M. (2014) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdu023 · Cited by 800
7. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research
Kagel, J. H. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-009 · Cited by 785
Self-citationAn Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
Ausubel, L. M. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052330 · Cited by 727
McMillan, J. (1994) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.8.3.145 · Cited by 699
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.1.159 · Cited by 530
Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1993) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234706 · Cited by 474
Self-citationKagel, J. H., Harstad, R. M., & Levin, D. (2009) · Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse · doi:10.1515/9781400830138.177 · Cited by 458
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Cited by
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
de Vries, S., & Vohra, R. V. (2003) · INFORMS Journal on Computing · doi:10.1287/ijoc.15.3.284.16077 · Cited by 985
Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
Ausubel, L. M., Cramton, P., Pycia, M., Rostek, M., & Weretka, M. (2014) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdu023 · Cited by 800
An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
Ausubel, L. M. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828043052330 · Cited by 727
Market mechanisms and funding dynamics in equity crowdfunding
Hornuf, L., & Schwienbacher, A. (2018) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.08.009 · Cited by 361
Shen, Z. M., & Su, X. (2007) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00291.x · Cited by 337
Metadata
- Authors
- Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2001-03
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 413-454
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2101012698
- Cited by
- 260
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 17.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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