The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Measuring lying aversion
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Cites
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
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Self-citationLIES IN DISGUISE-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
Fischbacher, U., & Föllmi-Heusi, F. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12014 · Cited by 1,243
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Self-citationToo tired to tell the truth: Self-control resource depletion and dishonesty
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Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from Individuals and Teams
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Patterns of neural activity associated with honest and dishonest moral decisions
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Cheating in mind games: The subtlety of rules matters
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Separating Will from Grace: An experiment on conformity and awareness in cheating
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Lies in Disguise. An experimental study on cheatingPreprint
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Avoiding lying: The case of delegated deception
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Motivation, money, prestige and cheats
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Cited by
Abeler, J., Nosenzo, D., & Raymond, C. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2840132 · Cited by 840
Mathematical foundations of moral preferences
Capraro, V., & Perc, M. (2021) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0880 · Cited by 310
Let’s be honest: A review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling
Rosenbaum, S. M., Billinger, S., & Stieglitz, N. (2014) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2014.10.002 · Cited by 288
Epstein, Z., Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. (2020) · Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3313831.3376232 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Gneezy, U., Rockenbach, B., & Serra-Garcia, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-09
- Volume
- 93
- Pages
- 293-300
- ISSN
- 0167-2681 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2162311572
- Cited by
- 321
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 62.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.