Cited by 277Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentEthics in Business and EducationSocial and Intergroup Psychology

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: a reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

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Greene, Joshua D.·2009·Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jesp.2009.01.003

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  • In low-conflict impersonal dilemmas, people are more likely to make utilitarian judgments supported by the conscious-controlled process.

    “When people are confronted with a low-conflict impersonal dilemma (such as Trolley problem), they are more likely to make a utilitarian judgment (sacrifice the few to save the many), which supported by conscious-controlled process.”
  • In design scenarios, participants adopt a role that aligns more closely with the conscious-controlled process.

    “When they engage in the design of moral algorithms for AVs, they adopt a role that aligns more closely with the conscious-controlled process in Joshua Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgment (Greene, 2009).”
  • Greene's theory suggests that moral decisions stem from automatic-emotional and conscious-controlled processes.

    “Greene’s theory suggested that our moral decisions stem from one of two distinct cognitive processes, namely, automatic-emotional process and conscious-controlled process (Greene, 2009).”
  • Greene's theory shows that people's deeds and deliberative moral judgments can sometimes conflict.

    “Briefly, Greene’s theory shows that people’s deed and deliberative moral judgments can be sometimes conflict with each other.”
  • The automatic-emotional process is rapid and unconscious, leading to intuitive actions and judgments, while the conscious-controlled process is slower and involves deliberate reasoning.

    “The automatic-emotional process is rapid and unconscious, leading to intuitive actions and judgments, while the conscious-controlled process is slower and involves deliberate reasoning.”

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References 23 · Cited by 277

Authors
Greene, J. D.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Greene, Joshua D.
Venue
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2009-05
Volume
45
Issue
3
Pages
581-584
ISSN
0022-1031 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2133627277
Cited by
277
References
23
Citations by year
2026: 12 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 52 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 14 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 16 · 2012: 15
FWCI
5.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
Keywords
dual-process theory, moral judgment, deontological judgment, utilitarian judgment, reaction time, emotion and moral judgment, patient studies, emotion induction

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