The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information
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Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839588 · Cited by 10,641
Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1988) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.292693 · Cited by 4,386
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results
Boot, A. W. A., Thakor, A. V., & Udell, G. F. (1991) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233552 · Cited by 512
Equilibrium loan pricing under the bank–client relationship
Greenbaum, S. I., Kanatas, G., & Venezia, I. (1989) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(89)90061-7 · Cited by 339
Cited by
Bank size, lending technologies, and small business finance
Berger, A. N., & Black, L. K. (2011) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.09.004 · Cited by 468
Self-citationCollateralization, Bank Loan Rates, and Monitoring
CERQUEIRO, G., ONGENA, S., & ROSZBACH, K. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12214 · Cited by 286
Mhlanga, D. (2021) · International Journal of Financial Studies · doi:10.3390/ijfs9030039 · Cited by 254
Metadata
- Authors
- Berger, A. N., Espinosa-Vega, M. A., Frame, W. S., & Miller, N. H.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Intermediation
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-01
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 55-70
- ISSN
- 1042-9573 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121967467
- Cited by
- 234
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 26.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- The paper
- Berger, A. N., Espinosa-Vega, M. A., Frame, W. S., & Miller, N. H. (2011). Why do borrowers pledge collateral? New empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information. Journal of Financial Intermediation. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2010.01.001
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.