The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results
Abstract
Arnoud W. A. Boot, Anjan V. Thakor, Gregory F. Udell; Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results, Th
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Pledging outside collateral may attenuate moral hazard by reducing the incentives to switch into riskier projects or to reduce effort.
“Similarly, pledging outside collateral may attenuate moral hazard by reducing the incentives to switch into riskier projects or to reduce eort (Boot et al., 1991).”
From The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle (1998) · cites this paper as Boot et al., 1991
Most theoretical models of outside collateral find that safer borrowers within an observationally equivalent risk pool tend to pledge outside collateral, except Boot et al. (1991).
“Most of the models of outside collateral ®nd that safer borrowers within the pool will tend to pledge outside collateral (see Boot et al. (1991) for an exception)”
From The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle (1998) · cites this paper as Boot et al. (1991)
Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements
Chan, Y.-S., & Kanatas, G. (1985) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1992508 · Cited by 473
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
N. Berger, A., & F. Udell, G. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00038-7 · Cited by 3,690
“Similarly, pledging outside collateral may attenuate moral hazard by reducing the incentives to switch into riskier projects or to reduce effort (Boot, Thakor, and Udell 1991).”
Self-citationFinTech and banking: What do we know?
Thakor, A. V. (2020) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2019.100833 · Cited by 1,378
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Boot, A. W. A., Thakor, A. V., & Udell, G. F.
- Affiliations
- Northwestern University (US)
- Indiana University (US)
- New York University (US)
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-05
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 406
- Pages
- 458
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2070112618
- Cited by
- 512
- References
- 2
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 18 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 34 · 2012: 34
- FWCI
- 4.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Economic Journal (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Credit Risk and Financial Regulations
- Keywords
- secured lending, default risk, credit markets, collateral, credit policy, equilibrium analysis
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
