The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 2 of the 17 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship
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Claims the paper makes
2 of 17 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The coefficient estimate suggests that the difference in entry rates between retail and pulp in the Czech Republic (which is at the 25 th percentile in terms of EntCost with entry costs equal to 8% of per capita GNP) is 0.5 percentage points higher than the difference in entry rates between the same industries in Italy (which is at the 75 th percentile in terms of EntCost with entry costs equal to”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.1 Entry barriers and permutations
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our final sample includes 3,371,073 firms in 21 countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.2 Sample selection
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Four countries do not meet the criteria: Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.2 Sample selection
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our results are robust to the exclusion of these countries.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.1 Entry barriers and permutations
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Entry rates across countries and industries using the Amadeus database and Eurostat data are significantly correlated at about 67%.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.1 Entry barriers and permutations
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We indeed find higher entry rates into industries with high entry in the U.S. in countries with fewer entry procedures.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.1 Entry barriers and permutations
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesThe paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The average value added of new firms in high-entry industries is disproportionately higher in countries that have higher entry costs.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 1. Introduction
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- The authors state this as an assumption: Technological determinants of entry into an industry (such as minimum scale) carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Barriers to entry are low in the United States.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The rank ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We find that the growth in value added per employee for firms older than two years is relatively lower in naturally high-entry industries when the industry is in a country with higher bureaucratic barriers to entry, consistent with the hypothesis that entry regulations indiscriminately screen out small young firms and inhibit the disciplinary effects of competition.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 1. Introduction
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- The authors state this as an assumption: Technological determinants of entry into an industry (such as minimum scale) carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Barriers to entry are low in the United States.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The rank ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In Column (iii) we include the monetized value of the entrepreneur's time to set up a business in the cost of entry and find similar results.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.1 Entry barriers and permutations
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesA result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We find that costly regulations hamper the creation of new firms, especially in industries that should naturally have high entry.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Abstract
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passes- The authors state this as an assumption: Technological determinants of entry into an industry (such as minimum scale) carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Barriers to entry are low in the United States.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The rank ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 51
- Probably not a substantial claim. 30
- The quote only partly states this claim. 4
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Our findings suggest an explanation for the low level of incorporation in Italy: the average direct cost associated with fulfilling the bureaucratic regulations for registering a new corporation in Italy is 20% of per capita GNP compared to 10% of per capita GNP on average for other G-7 European countries.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 1. Introduction
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Djankov et al. (2002) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Table III (page unavailable) reports Italy’s direct entry cost as 24.74% of per capita GDP, not 20%. Its figures for the other European G-7 countries—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—average about 9.6%, supporting the approximately 10% comparison. The paper uses GDP rather than GNP as the denominator. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Di Patti and Dell'Ariccia (2004) find that entry is higher in informationally opaque industries in Italian regions that have a more concentrated banking sector.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6 Other regulations and the business environment
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Di Patti and Dell'Ariccia (2004) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Conclusions report that competition is relatively more beneficial to firm birth in less opaque industries, consistent with the cited comparison. But the Economy-Wide Effect section finds a nonlinear relationship: for relatively opaque industries, firm birth rises with concentration only up to a point and then falls. The claim omits that qualification; the study also measures Italian provinces rather than regions. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Partly supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Across all industries, firms start out larger when young in Italy, but grow more slowly so that firms in the United Kingdom are about twice as large by age ten (Figure 1).”
- Also stated in: § 4.5 The consequences of preventing free entry · plain
“Across all industries, firms start out larger when young in Italy, but grow more slowly so that firms in the United Kingdom are about twice as large by age ten.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > In this regard, the comparison between high-entry-regulation Italy and the low-entry-regulation
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § 4.5 The consequences of preventing free entry · plain
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Interestingly, they matter most in richer countries, or countries that are not corrupt, where the regulations on the books are more likely to be enforced.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 1. Introduction
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Technological determinants of entry into an industry (such as minimum scale) carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Barriers to entry are low in the United States.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The rank ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.1 Entry barriers and permutations
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our results are also robust to adding back those countries that fail to meet our inclusion criteria (i.e., Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal), and to dropping one country at a time (not reported in tables).”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.1 Entry barriers and permutations
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We find that these aspects of the business environment do matter, but primarily for the rate of incorporation, and not for the size of entrants or the productivity growth of incumbents.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > In this regard, the comparison between high-entry-regulation Italy and the low-entry-regulation
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Technological determinants of entry into an industry (such as minimum scale) carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Barriers to entry are low in the United States.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The rank ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Actually, the share of new corporations in Italy (the fraction of corporations that are one or two years old) is only 3.8% compared to 13.5% on average for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 1. Introduction
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Value added per employee for older incumbents grows relatively more slowly in naturally high-entry industries in countries with costly bureaucratic barriers, although this effect is absent for young incumbents.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 1. Introduction
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Technological determinants of entry into an industry (such as minimum scale) carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Barriers to entry are low in the United States.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The rank ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Column (vi) shows that the results are robust to using instrumental variables, although the magnitude of the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is somewhat reduced.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.5 The consequences of preventing free entry
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In particular, the results in Table 7 are also robust to (i) the exclusion of Italy, a developed country with relatively high entry barriers, and (ii) the exclusion of the following information technology-intensive industries: manufacture of communication equipment (NACE 32) and computer and related activities (NACE 72).”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.2 Robustness to outliers
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“They suggest that the adverse interaction effects on growth are present primarily for the older firms, and a likelihood ratio test confirms the difference in coefficients across the two samples.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.5 The consequences of preventing free entry
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We find that these aspects of the business environment have a significant impact, but primarily on the rate of incorporation and not on the productivity growth of incumbents.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6 Other regulations and the business environment
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Nevertheless, the correlation between entry rates in the U.S. and in the United Kingdom is 0.60 and significant at the 1% level.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.3 Alternative measures
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“When we estimate a regression with all the interactions included in Table 11A, Column (iv), we find that all variables retain their predicted effect and statistical significance except the financial development interaction”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6.4. Business environment
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Industry characteristics measured from U.S. data (external financial dependence, labor intensity, R&D intensity) are valid proxies for the same industry characteristics in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In Table 11A, Column (iii), the interaction variable is positive and significant”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6.3 Regulations protecting property
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Industry characteristics measured from U.S. data (external financial dependence, labor intensity, R&D intensity) are valid proxies for the same industry characteristics in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Because the correlations in Table 11B suggest that higher entry costs accompany lower private credit to GDP, more stringent employee protection, and lower property rights protection”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6.4. Business environment
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Industry characteristics measured from U.S. data (external financial dependence, labor intensity, R&D intensity) are valid proxies for the same industry characteristics in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, our main interaction variable between EntryUS and EntCost remains highly significant and virtually unchanged in magnitude, suggesting that bureaucratic regulations have an independent effect over and above the effects of the inhospitable environment.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.4 Causality 20
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In sum, value added per worker grows relatively more slowly for older incumbents in naturally high-entry industries in countries with high bureaucratic barriers but not for young incumbents.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.5 The consequences of preventing free entry
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Entry costs tend to be lowest in countries with Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian legal origin and highest in countries with French legal origin.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.4 Causality 20
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The correlation between entry rates in the U.S. and the average entry rate across Europe is 0.60 and significant at the 1% level.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.3 Alternative measures
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“When we instrument entry regulation with legal origin, we find that the coefficient estimate for the interaction term is highly significant, the same sign and approximately the same magnitude as shown earlier in Table 7 (Column (i) in Table 9).”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.4 Causality 20
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The coefficient estimate for the interaction between EntryUS and Informal is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that underreporting of new firms is more likely in high-entry industries in countries with an inhospitable business environment.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.4 Causality 20
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Since the average real growth rate in value added per worker is 1%, this is a sizeable magnitude.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.5 The consequences of preventing free entry
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Importantly, when we control for these other aspects of the business environment, entry regulations remain an important determinant of new firm entry and the growth of incumbent firms.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6 Other regulations and the business environment
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Other regulations and aspects of the business environment could capture similar aspects of an unfavorable business environment as entry regulations.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The correlation between our measure of the informal sector (Informal) calculated as the size of the informal economy as a percentage of official GNI averaged over the period 1999-2000 and the cost of entry regulations (EntCost) is 0.37 although not statistically significant at the 10 percent level.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.4 Causality 20
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“When we replace the EntryUS variables with EntryUS, 1990-2000, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term remains highly significant and of similar magnitude (Column (vii) in Table 8).”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.3 Alternative measures
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The coefficient estimate of the entry costs interaction remains statistically significant and of similar magnitude in Table 11 A Column (iv) as in the baseline regression in Table 7, Column (i).”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6.4. Business environment
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Industry characteristics measured from U.S. data (external financial dependence, labor intensity, R&D intensity) are valid proxies for the same industry characteristics in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“When we restrict our sample to small industries, we still find a strongly significant interaction coefficient of approximately the same magnitude as shown earlier in Table 7 (Column (iii) in Table 9).”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.4 Causality 20
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“EntryUS * EntCost | -0.175***”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✗ Asserted: fails✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one. The quote only partly states this claim.
- Rests on an assumption: Legal origin is a valid instrument for entry regulations.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“EntryUS * Informal | | | | | | | -0.057***”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one. The quote only partly states this claim.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“EntryUS * GDP per capita | | | | 0.419***”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one. The quote only partly states this claim.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Low GDP per capita * EntryUS * EntCost | | | | | 0.087”
- Also stated in: § Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables · plain
“High GDP per capita * EntryUS * EntCost | | | | | -0.170***”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
- Also stated in: § Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“EntryUS * EntCost | -0.175*** | | | -0.110*** -0.198*** |”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“EntryUS * EntCost | -0.175*** | | | -0.110*** -0.198*** |”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“EntryUS * EntCost -0.038 -0.396**”
- Also stated in: § Additional information · plain
“(0.281) (0.199)”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Additional information
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
- Also stated in: § Additional information · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Likelihood ratio test of equality of all regression coefficients (p-value) 0.001***”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Additional information
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“High Corruption * EntryUS * EntCost | | | | | | 0.186”
- Also stated in: § Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables · plain
“Low Corruption * EntryUS * EntCost | | | | | | -0.168***”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
- Also stated in: § Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Importantly, the entry regulation interaction continues to enter negatively and is statistically significant and with a similar order of magnitude as the regressions reported in Table 10.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6.5 Performance of incumbents and other regulations
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Industry characteristics measured from U.S. data (external financial dependence, labor intensity, R&D intensity) are valid proxies for the same industry characteristics in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Wald test of equality of slope coefficients (p-value) 0.300”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Additional information
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“EntryUS * EntCost&Time | | | -0.211***”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“EntryUS * EntProc | | -0.656***”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“EntryUS * Country-average Entry | | 2.730”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one. The quote only partly states this claim.
- Rests on an assumption: U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We believe that our inclusion criteria create the most comparable sample of firms across countries, but we should be cautious about deriving strong conclusions from direct cross-country comparisons.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.2 Sample selection
Load-bearingStrength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“consistent with the hypothesis that entry regulations indiscriminately screen out small young firms and inhibit the disciplinary effects of competition.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 1. Introduction
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Technological determinants of entry into an industry (such as minimum scale) carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Barriers to entry are low in the United States.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The rank ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Next we delete from our sample firms that report only consolidated statements, to avoid doublecounting firms and subsidiaries or operations abroad.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.2 Sample selection
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Finally, we exclude all legal forms other than the equivalent of public and private limited liability corporations.2 In particular, we exclude proprietorships and partnerships.”
- Also stated in: § 2.2 Sample selection · plain
“However, most European countries require all limited liability corporations to file financial statements, which makes the coverage for corporations extensive and the best available.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.2 Sample selection
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § 2.2 Sample selection · plain
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A second reason is that efforts were made in 1998 to expand the coverage for Central and Eastern European countries allowing us to include more countries, but making the prior data less comparable.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.2 Sample selection
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This means that not only do such regulations discourage small firms from setting up, they also force others to grow without the protection of limited liability until they reach a scale that makes the cost of incorporation affordable.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 1. Introduction
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Technological determinants of entry into an industry (such as minimum scale) carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Barriers to entry are low in the United States.
- The authors state this as an assumption: The rank ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We check that the results are not qualitatively affected by including firms under one year old as new firms.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.3 Industry-level entry variables
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We do, however, check the robustness of the results to measures based on entry in other regions.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 3. Methodology
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The industry j share of total sales in country k captures an industry-specific convergence effect: we correct for the possibility that sectors that are large relative to the rest of the economy experience lower entry rates.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 3. Methodology
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We require firms to survive at least one year and exclude firms in year 0. We exclude firms less than one year old to avoid frivolous filings and because of the difference in initial filing requirements across countries.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.3 Industry-level entry variables
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This means the entry barriers are likely to be more onerous for small firms where this latter assumption is likely to be true.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.3 Industry-level entry variables
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our empirical results are qualitatively robust to defining new firms as age equal to one or to using entry rates calculated for one year (1998 or 1999) only.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.3 Industry-level entry variables
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes? Load-bearing: unclear✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, even if we have not eliminated all biases between countries, our basic test examines within-country differences across countries, and will not be affected unless there are systematic biases in reporting industries within a country.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.2 Sample selection
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We get similar results when we use value added rather than sales as a measure of relative industry size, but prefer to use sales as a measure of size because value added figures are missing for several industries in a number of countries.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 3. Methodology
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Since new firms in this largest category are likely to be existing firms that reincorporate following a merger or acquisition, we check that our qualitative results hold when we exclude new firms with more than 250 employees.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 2.3 Industry-level entry variables
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“In fact, Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggest that the absence of regulations protecting investors could be a very effective barrier to new firm creation.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6.1 Access to finance
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rajan and Zingales (2003) source
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“these could all be aspects of an unfavorable business environment (or, put another way, good institutions tend to go together).”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6.4. Business environment
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Industry characteristics measured from U.S. data (external financial dependence, labor intensity, R&D intensity) are valid proxies for the same industry characteristics in other countries.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Taken together, these results suggest that the regulation of entry seems to have causal effects, more so in wealthy countries or countries that are not corrupt than in poor or corrupt countries.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.4 Causality 20
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Fisman and Love (2003a) focus on access to trade credit rather than bank credit and find that industries with higher dependence on trade credit financing exhibit higher growth rates in countries with relatively weak financial institutions.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6 Other regulations and the business environment
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Fisman and Love (2003a) source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“Dunne and Roberts (1991) and Cable and Schwalbach (1991) study U.S. and international data, respectively, and find that the relation between industry characteristics and industry turnover patterns is stable over time.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.3 Alternative measures
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Dunne and Roberts (1991)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites Cable and Schwalbach (1991)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Not matched
In the paper
“Black and Strahan (2002) find that financial development following bank deregulation fostered firm entry in the United States.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6 Other regulations and the business environment
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Black and Strahan (2002) source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:direct· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“While low credit, high labor regulation, or low protection of property rights could particularly affect young firms”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6.5 Performance of incumbents and other regulations
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedCausal:conditional· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✗ Based: failsProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These data improve upon previously used datasets in that they include (1) a large number of private, unlisted, and publicly traded corporations and (2) all sectors (i.e., not limited to manufacturing).”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 5. Conclusion
Load-bearingStrength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This is not exactly the same as our findings, since new establishments need not be new entry but could simply be new plants set up by existing firms.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“suggesting that small firms are dissuaded from entering or have to grow without the protection of limited liability until they can afford the costs of incorporation.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 5. Conclusion
Tests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✓ Load-bearing: passes✓ Based: passesIt may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Industry characteristics measured from U.S. data (external financial dependence, labor intensity, R&D intensity) are valid proxies for the same industry characteristics in other countries.
- Rests on an assumption: Legal origin of the country is a valid instrument for entry cost.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The results do not alter when we include the latter.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that there are more new establishments in industrial sectors with greater external financing needs in more developed financial systems.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Rajan and Zingales (1998)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In sum, there could well be offsetting effects of other constraints to entry as hypothesized above”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > 4.6.5 Performance of incumbents and other regulations
Strength:hedged· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✗ Checkable: fails✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Rests on an assumption: Industry characteristics measured from U.S. data (external financial dependence, labor intensity, R&D intensity) are valid proxies for the same industry characteristics in other countries.
What the paper did — it cites no source for this, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Due to lags in data collection, the coverage for the year is incomplete.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“Except for the work by Scarpetta et al. (2002), none of these other papers also examine entry regulations.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Scarpetta et al. (2002)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Not matched
In the paper
“Using survey data from five transition countries on the reinvestment of profits by entrepreneurs, Johnson et al. (2002) find lower investment by entrepreneurs in countries with weak property rights.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Johnson et al. (2002) source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2002) find that the average size of firms in human capital and in R&D intensive industries is larger in countries that protect property rights and patents.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2002)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Not matched
In the paper
“Claessens and Laeven (2003) find that growth of industries that rely on intangible assets is disproportionately lower in countries with weak intellectual property rights.”
§ ENTRY REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTREPRENEURSHIP > Table 11B: Correlations between Regulatory Variables
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Claessens and Laeven (2003) source
Strength:plain· not yet calibratedCausal:correlational· not yet calibratedTests✓ Asserted: passes✓ Checkable: passes✗ Load-bearing: fails✓ Based: passesProbably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The authors state this as an assumption.
Technological determinants of entry into an industry (such as minimum scale) carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.
“We assume these determinants carry over countries and are absorbed by industry indicators.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Barriers to entry are low in the United States.
“Under the assumption that these barriers are low in the United States”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The rank ordering of entry in the United States corresponds to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and this rank ordering carries over to other countries.
“Nevertheless, all that is important for us is that the rank ordering of entry in the United States correspond to the rank ordering of natural barriers across industries, and that this rank ordering carry over to other countries.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The error term has the usual distributional assumptions.
“Finally, k j, ε is an error term with the usual distributional assumptions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Industry shares of total sales capture a potential convergence effect.
“These industry shares of total sales are expected to capture a potential convergence effect.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The method works so long as entry rates are measured in a country where barriers to entry are thought to be small.
“Our method should work so long as we measure entry rates in a country where barriers to entry are thought to be small.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Small industries are unlikely to be responsible for entry barriers because they have limited political clout.
“These industries are unlikely to be responsible for the entry barriers since they have limited political clout.”
The paper relies on this without support.
More developed countries have better-developed information systems, product inspections, quality control, contract and law enforcement, and consequently an entrepreneurial population less inclined to misbehavior.
“More developed countries have better-developed information systems, better product inspections and quality control, better contract and law enforcement, and consequently, an entrepreneurial population less inclined to misbehavior.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The richer infrastructure gives the population more incentive to behave, so there is less need for screening.
“(The underlying population in wealthier countries might also be socialized to be more honest (less adverse selection) but for our purposes it is only necessary that the richer infrastructure gives them more incentive to behave, so there is less need for screening.)”
The paper relies on this without support.
In countries where tax avoidance and other reasons make informality attractive, there is less entry into the formal sector and fewer firms choosing the legal form of a limited liability company.
“In countries where for tax avoidance and other reasons it is attractive to remain informal, we expect to see less entry into the formal sector and fewer firms choosing the legal form of a limited liability company.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Entry regulations can be thought of as a fixed cost.
“Entry regulations, at least in the way we measure them, could be thought of as a fixed cost.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Other regulations and aspects of the business environment could capture similar aspects of an unfavorable business environment as entry regulations.
“To the extent that onerous entry regulations go together with lower financial development, more stringent employee protection, and lower property rights protection, they could all capture similar aspects of an unfavorable business environment.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Industry characteristics measured from U.S. data (external financial dependence, labor intensity, R&D intensity) are valid proxies for the same industry characteristics in other countries.
“The industry variable measured from U.S. data, R&D, is a measure of dependence on research and development and equals the industry-level median of the ratio of research and development expenses to sales for Compustat firms in the same industry over the period 1990-99.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Legal origin of the country is a valid instrument for entry cost.
“We use legal origin of the country as instrument for entry cost.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Legal origin is a valid instrument for entry regulations.
“In column (i), we use the legal origin variable in La Porta et al. (1998) as instrument for entry regulations.”
The paper relies on this without support.
U.S. industry entry rates are a valid benchmark for the industry's underlying entry potential in other countries.
“EntryUS is the ratio of new firms to total firms in the U.S., by two-digit NACE industry code(Dun & Bradstreet).”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Labor intensity has conflicting denominators and periods
MajorThe methodology defines LabInt as employees divided by fixed assets using 1998-99 data. Its appendix definition instead divides employees by value added and uses 1990-99 data.
“We calculate labor intensity, LabInt, from U.S. data as the industry median over all Compustat firms in that industry of the number of employees divided by the amount of fixed assets (in millions of dollars), and is calculated over all firm-years over the period 1998-99.”
“Labor intensity (LabInt) Measure of labor intensity, equal to the amount of employees per value added, industry medians of ratios over all firm-years in the relevant time period.We compute this measure for all U.S. firms for the period 1990-99.”
Exit is defined using different events
MajorThe results section counts closures or acquisitions as exits, but Appendix 3 defines exit as following formal bankruptcy proceedings. Those definitions do not describe the same set of events.
“Exit US, which is the share of firms that exit in the U.S. D&B data measured by the number of firms that exit in year t (because of closure or acquisition) as a percentage of all firms in year t-1.”
“Exit is the percentage of firms that exited following formal bankruptcy proceedings.”
Scale is assigned incompatible calculation periods
MinorTable 10 says Scale averages data from 1998-99, but the appendix says it is computed from firms in 1995.
“EntryUS, SME, Scale, and Size are averages for the period 1998-99 and calculated at the two-digit NACE industry level.”
“Total Assets (Scale) Industry-level median of total assets.We compute this measure for all U.S. firms for the year 1995.”
Two U.S. entry rates are given for NACE 74
MinorTable 4 reports a U.S. entry rate of 6.46% for other business activities, whereas Appendix 3 reports 9.65% for the same NACE code and industry.
“-Other business activities 74 16.98 8.76 6.46”
“74 Other business activities 9.65 4.60”
Estonia exceeds the stated highest entry rate
MinorThe text names Lithuania as having the highest entry rate at 19.2%, but Table 3 reports 20.41% for Estonia.
“The entry rate varies from a high of 19.2% in Lithuania to a low of 3.5% in Italy.”
“Estonia 20.41 n.a.n.a.Finland 11.13 5 1.16 France 14.68 15 14.30 Germany 12.34 10 15.69 Greece 15.44 15 58.60 Hungary 17.38 8 85.87 Italy 3.46 16 20.02Latvia 18.16 7 42.34Lithuania 19.23 10 5.46”
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“This not only improves access to investment opportunities and inspires entrepreneurship (Klapper et al. 2006; Munemo 2017), but it also boosts financial commitments to energy technology and supports the use of environmentally friendly innovations (Anton & Nucu 2020; Kim & Park 2016).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Klapper, L., Laeven, L., & Rajan, R.
- Affiliations
- World Bank (US)
- International Monetary Fund (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rajan, Raghuram
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-12
- Volume
- 82
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 591-629
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2116184502
- Semantic Scholar
- 9d0b23dbb25f3706b54859728f416d6b628f66df
- Cited by
- 1,723
- References
- 37
- Citations by year
- 2026: 89 · 2025: 91 · 2024: 77 · 2023: 89 · 2022: 96 · 2021: 109 · 2020: 113 · 2019: 94 · 2018: 93 · 2017: 101 · 2016: 79 · 2015: 100 · 2014: 95 · 2013: 135 · 2012: 70
- FWCI
- 119.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.nber.org
- Locations
- Journal of Financial Economics (publishedVersion)
- Research portal (Tilburg University) (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Firm Innovation and Growth
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management of Technology and Innovation › Entrepreneurship Studies and Influences
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Keywords
- entry regulation, entrepreneurship, startups, firm size, barriers to entry, European firms, intellectual property protection, labor regulation, access to finance
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