The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Unstable banking
Open accessAbstract
We propose a theory of financial intermediaries operating in markets influenced by investor sentiment. In our model, banks make loans, securitize these loans, trade in them, or hold cash. They can also borrow money, using their security holdings as collateral. We embed such banks in a stylized financial market, in which securitized loans may be mispriced, and investigate how banks allocate limited capital among the various activities, as well as how they choose their capital structure. Banks maximize profits, and there are no conflicts of interest between bank shareholders and creditors. The theory explains the cyclical behavior of credit and investment, but also accounts for the fundamental instability of banks operating in financial markets, especially when banks use leverage.
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Citations
Cites
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476 · cited 1×
“Rather than delegate all their investment to the banks as in the model of Diamond (1984), investors in our model have definite preferences over assets.”
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03807.x · Cited by 5,291
Self-citationCredit, Money, and Aggregate Demand
Bernanke, B., & Blinder, A. (1988) · doi:10.3386/w2534 · Cited by 1,436
Gorton, G. (2008) · doi:10.3386/w14398 · Cited by 81
Cited by
Liaisons dangereuses: Increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and systemic risk
Battiston, S., Delli Gatti, D., Gallegati, M., Greenwald, B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2012) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2012.04.001 · Cited by 734
Maddaloni, A., & Peydró, J.-L. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr015 · Cited by 678
Financial innovation and endogenous growth
Laeven, L., Levine, R., & Michalopoulos, S. (2015) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2014.04.001 · Cited by 534
Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis
DeYoung, R., & Torna, G. (2013) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2013.01.001 · Cited by 532
How does competition affect bank systemic risk?
Anginer, D., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Zhu, M. (2014) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2013.11.001 · Cited by 527
Metadata
- Authors
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2010-09
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 306-318
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4234246145
- Cited by
- 431
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 49.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2010). Unstable banking. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.10.007
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
