The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary. Diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs, even in a risk neutral economy. The paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems. In the environment assumed in the model, debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal. The analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries.
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In the citing paper
“Given these barriers to corporate governance by small and large shareholders, financial intermediaries may arise to monitor firms and managers.”
From Finance, Growth, and Inequality (2021) · cites this paper as Diamond (1984)
In the citing paper
“Costly state veri®cation (Townsend, 1979;Diamond, 1984) and adverse selection (Myers, 1984;Myers and Majluf, 1984;Nachman and Noe, 1994) arguments suggest the optimality of debt contracts after insider ®nance has been exhausted.”
From The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle (1998) · cites this paper as Diamond, 1984
Citations
Cites
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Self-citationMoral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing
Ross, S. A. (1976) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(76)90046-6 · Cited by 7,009
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
Pratt, J. W. (1976) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912743 · Cited by 4,654
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x · Cited by 4,055
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Smith, C. W., & Warner, J. B. (1979) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(79)90011-4 · Cited by 2,894
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
Shavell, S. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003319 · Cited by 1,285
Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation
Ramakrishnan, R. T. S., & Thakor, A. V. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297431 · Cited by 1,160
Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Self-citationThe Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data
PETERSEN, M. A., & RAJAN, R. G. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x · Cited by 5,440
Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector
Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555316 · Cited by 3,889
N. Berger, A., & F. Udell, G. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00038-7 · Cited by 3,690
“Costly state verification (Townsend 1979, Diamond 1984) and adverse selection (Myers 1984, Myers and Majluf 1984, Nachman and Noe 1994) arguments suggest the optimality of debt contracts after insider cFor example, there are generally accepted definitions of the stages of finance for the kind of…”
Metadata
- Authors
- Diamond, D. W.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- Corresponding author
- Diamond, Douglas W.
- ORCID
- Diamond, Douglas W.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1984-07
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 393
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2108491286
- Cited by
- 8,476
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 302 · 2025: 334 · 2024: 309 · 2023: 293 · 2022: 248 · 2021: 326 · 2020: 316 · 2019: 291 · 2018: 286 · 2017: 351 · 2016: 323 · 2015: 300 · 2014: 334 · 2013: 347 · 2012: 369
- FWCI
- 55.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Review of Economic Studies (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Keywords
- financial intermediation, delegated monitoring, monitoring costs, incentive problems, creditor-debtor relations, diversification, risk neutrality, debt contracts, portfolio composition, capital structure
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- Diamond, D. W. (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297430
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.