The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information
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Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769 · cited 1×
“…by adverse selection 1 Renegotiations, which are frequent in private debt agreements (Smith, 1993), limit the cases in which assets are tied up in less productive uses and hence limit the opportunity costs to the borrower. and credit rationing in the spirit of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).”
The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data
PETERSEN, M. A., & RAJAN, R. G. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x · Cited by 5,440
Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1988) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.292693 · Cited by 4,386
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
The importance of relationships to the availability of credit
Cole, R. A. (1998) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/s0378-4266(98)00007-7 · Cited by 849
Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (1994) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2527003 · Cited by 827
Secured Lending and Default Risk: Equilibrium Analysis, Policy Implications and Empirical Results
Boot, A. W. A., Thakor, A. V., & Udell, G. F. (1991) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233552 · Cited by 512
Equilibrium loan pricing under the bank–client relationship
Greenbaum, S. I., Kanatas, G., & Venezia, I. (1989) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(89)90061-7 · Cited by 339 · cited 1×
“First, the more opaque the firm is, the more valuable is the private information to the lender – potentially leading to an information monopoly or “lock-in” effect that would manifest itself through positive relations (e.g., Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia 1989, Sharpe 1990, Rajan 1992).”
Pace, N. R. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/441289a · Cited by 276
The incidence of secured debt: Evidence from the small business community
Leeth, J. D., & Scott, J. A. (1989) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2330818 · Cited by 228
Cited by
Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking, and Pricing: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment
Ioannidou, V., Ongena, S., & Peydró, J.-L. (2015) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfu035 · Cited by 344
Self-citationCollateralization, Bank Loan Rates, and Monitoring
CERQUEIRO, G., ONGENA, S., & ROSZBACH, K. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12214 · Cited by 286
Metadata
- Authors
- Berger, A. N., Scott Frame, W., & Ioannidou, V.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2011-04
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 85-97
- ISSN
- 0304-405X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124830261
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 17.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.