When and how should infant industries be protected?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper develops and analyzes a welfare maximizing model of infant industry protection. The domestic infant industry is competitive and experiences dynamic learning effects that are external to firms. The competitive foreign industry is mature and produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for the domestic good. A government planner can protect the infant industry using domestic production subsidies, tariffs, or quotas in order to maximize domestic welfare over time. As protection is not always optimal (although the domestic industry experiences a learning externality), the paper shows how the decision to protect the industry should depend on the industry's learning potential, the shape of the learning curve, and the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. Assuming some reasonable restrictions on the flexibility over time of the policy instruments, the paper subsequently compares the effectiveness of the different instruments. Given such restrictions, the paper shows that quotas induce higher welfare levels than tariffs. In some cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any amount of government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota (including the case of a voluntary export restraint, where no revenue is collected). In similar cases, the quota may even be preferred to a domestic production subsidy.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundNontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization
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WTO Accession and Performance of Chinese Manufacturing Firms
Brandt, L., Van Biesebroeck, J., Wang, L., & Zhang, Y. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20121266 · Cited by 856
From market fixing to market-creating: a new framework for innovation policy
Mazzucato, M. (2016) · Industry and Innovation · doi:10.1080/13662716.2016.1146124 · Cited by 752
Trade, Foreign Investment, and Industrial Policy for Developing Countries*
Harrison, A., & Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00001-x · Cited by 595
The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime
Bonnitcha, J., Skovgaard Poulsen, L. N., & Waibel, M. (2017) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/law/9780198719540.001.0001 · Cited by 345
Metadata
- Authors
- Melitz, M. J.
- Venue
- Journal of International Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-05
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 177-196
- ISSN
- 0022-1996 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2127253363
- Cited by
- 259
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 8.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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