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Cited by 212

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Lying and team incentives

Open access
Conrads, Julian, Irlenbusch, Bernd, Rilke, Rainer Michael, Walkowitz, Gari·2013·Journal of Economic Psychology

Abstract

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.

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Metadata

Authors
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R. M., & Walkowitz, G.
Venue
Journal of Economic Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2013-02
Volume
34
Pages
1-7
ISSN
0167-4870 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2241459964
Cited by
212
References
3
FWCI
14.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Lying and team incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.011
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Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R. M., & Walkowitz, G. (2013). Lying and team incentives. Journal of Economic Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2012.10.011

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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