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Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations

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Batrancea, Larissa, Nichita, Anca, Olsen, Jerome, Kogler, Christoph, Kirchler, Erich, Hoelzl, Erik, Weiss, Avi, Torgler, Benno, Fooken, Jonas, Fuller, Joanne, Schaffner, Markus, Banuri, Sheheryar, Hassanein, Medhat, Alarcón-García, Gloria, Aldemir, Ceyhan, Apostol, Oana, Bank Weinberg, Diana, Batrancea, Ioan, Belianin, Alexis, Bello Gómez, Felipe de Jesús, Briguglio, Marie, Dermol, Valerij, Doyle, Elaine, Gcabo, Rebone, Gong, Binglin, Ennya, Sara, Essel-Anderson, Anthony, Frecknall-Hughes, Jane, Hasanain, Ali, Hizen, Yoichi, Huber, Odilo, Kaplanoglou, Georgia, Kudła, Janusz, Lemoine, Jérémy E., Leurcharusmee, Supanika, Matthiasson, Thorolfur, Mehta, Sanjeev, Min, Sejin, Naufal, George, Niskanen, Mervi, Nordblom, Katarina, Öztürk, Engin Bağış, Pacheco, Luis, Pántya, József, Rapanos, Vassilis, Roland-Lévy, Christine, Roux-Cesar, Ana Maria, Salamzadeh, Aidin, Savadori, Lucia, Schei, Vidar, Sharma, Manoj, Summers, Barbara, Suriya, Komsan, Tran, Quoc, Villegas-Palacio, Clara, Visser, Martine, Xia, Chun, Yi, Sunghwan, Zukauskas, Sarunas · 2019 · Journal of Economic Psychology
Cited by 227

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

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Authors
Batrancea, L., Nichita, A., Olsen, J., Kogler, C., Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., Weiss, A., Torgler, B., Fooken, J., Fuller, J., Schaffner, M., Banuri, S., Hassanein, M., Alarcón-García, G., Aldemir, C., Apostol, O., Bank Weinberg, D., Batrancea, I., Belianin, A., Bello Gómez, F. D. J., Briguglio, M., Dermol, V., Doyle, E., Gcabo, R., Gong, B., Ennya, S., Essel-Anderson, A., Frecknall-Hughes, J., Hasanain, A., Hizen, Y., Huber, O., Kaplanoglou, G., Kudła, J., Lemoine, J. E., Leurcharusmee, S., Matthiasson, T., Mehta, S., Min, S., Naufal, G., Niskanen, M., Nordblom, K., Öztürk, E. B., Pacheco, L., Pántya, J., Rapanos, V., Roland-Lévy, C., Roux-Cesar, A. M., Salamzadeh, A., Savadori, L., Schei, V., Sharma, M., Summers, B., Suriya, K., Tran, Q., Villegas-Palacio, C., Visser, M., Xia, C., Yi, S., & Zukauskas, S.
Venue
Journal of Economic Psychology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2019-10
Volume
74
Pages
102191
ISSN
0167-4870 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2960266701
Cited by
227
References
5
FWCI
26.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
hybrid

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