Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Intrinsic motives to pay taxes and to follow the law are important determinants for tax compliance, in addition to the material costs and benefits of tax compliance.
“Intrinsic motives to pay taxes and to follow the law are also important determinants for tax compliance, in addition to the material costs and benefits of tax compliance emphasized by economists since the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).”
From Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little? (2014) · cites this paper as Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
Cited by
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Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2014) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.28.4.99 · Cited by 819 · see citing works
The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance
Hallsworth, M., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., & Vlaev, I. (2017) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.003 · Cited by 764 · see citing works
Tax morale and conditional cooperation
Frey, B. S., & Torgler, B. (2007) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2006.10.006 · Cited by 671 · see citing works
Double/debiased machine learning for difference-in-differences models
Chang, N.-C. (2020) · The Econometrics Journal · doi:10.1093/ectj/utaa001 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
- Authors
- Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A.
- Affiliations
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1972-11
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 3-4
- Pages
- 323-338
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2088435028
- Cited by
- 4,970
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 236 · 2025: 213 · 2024: 253 · 2023: 304 · 2022: 273 · 2021: 283 · 2020: 329 · 2019: 245 · 2018: 257 · 2017: 205 · 2016: 183 · 2015: 233 · 2014: 215 · 2013: 194 · 2012: 168
- FWCI
- 7.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Public Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
- Keywords
- income tax evasion, tax avoidance, portfolio optimization, risk-taking, tax incentives
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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