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Informational lobbying and political contributions

Bennedsen, Morten, Feldmann, Sven E. · 2006 · Journal of Public Economics

Abstract

Interest groups can potentially influence political decision-makers by offering contributions and by providing relevant information that sways the decision in the group's favor. What mix of these two instruments should an interest group choose, and how does the use of one instrument affect the effectiveness of the other? In this paper we identify an information externality that raises the cost of offering contributions and show that this indirect search cost reduces the group's incentive to gather information when contributions are allowed. Furthermore, we analyze how competition among lobby groups as providers of information and contributions affect the choice and effectiveness of the instruments. We show that the information externality rewards the group that can abstain from information search and focus its influence on contributions.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.003

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Metadata

Authors
Bennedsen, M., & Feldmann, S. E.
Venue
Journal of Public Economics
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2006-05
Volume
90
Issue
4-5
Pages
631-656
ISSN
0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2014798218
Cited by
203
References
2
FWCI
28.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Informational lobbying and political contributions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.003
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Bennedsen, M., & Feldmann, S. E. (2006). Informational lobbying and political contributions. Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.08.003

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.