The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A general formula for the optimal level of social insurance
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Citations
Cites
A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation
Ramsey, F. P. (1927) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2222721 · Cited by 2,891
Unemployment Insurance And Unemployment Spells
Meyer, B. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2546 · Cited by 1,270
Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells
Meyer, B. D. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938349 · Cited by 1,178
Solutions manual for Microeconomic theory : Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
Hara, C., Segal, I., & Tadelis, S. (1997) · Oxford University Press eBooks · Cited by 992
Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hopenhayn, H. A., & Nicolini, J. P. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262078 · Cited by 588
Some aspects of optimal unemployment insurance
Baily, M. N. (1978) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(78)90053-1 · Cited by 561
Dankert, C. E. (1964) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2520565 · Cited by 477
Unemployment insurance and the distribution of unemployment spells
Moffitt, R. (1985) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(85)90068-5 · Cited by 445
Efficient Unemployment Insurance
Acemoğlu, D., & Shimer, R. J. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250084 · Cited by 441
Does Unemployment Insurance Crowd out Spousal Labor Supply?
Cullen, J. B., & Gruber, J. (2000) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209969 · Cited by 399
Unemployment insurance and precautionary saving
Engen, E. M., & Gruber, J. (2001) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3932(01)00051-4 · Cited by 330
Unemployment insurance benefit levels and consumption changes
Browning, M., & Crossley, T. F. (2001) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00084-0 · Cited by 290
Unemployment Insurance Takeup Rates and the After-Tax Value of Benefits
Anderson, P. M., & Meyer, B. D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555389 · Cited by 267
Unemployment insurance and reservation wages
Feldstein, M. S., & Poterba, J. M. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90070-7 · Cited by 217
Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed
Shimer, R., & Werning, I. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.1922 · Cited by 205
Shocks, Stocks, and Socks: Smoothing Consumption Over a Temporary Income Loss
Browning, M., & Crossley, T. F. (2009) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2009.7.6.1169 · Cited by 182
Optimal unemployment insurance in an estimated job search model with savings
Lentz, R. (2009) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1016/j.red.2008.01.004 · Cited by 163
Consumption Commitments and Risk Preferences
Chetty, R., & Szeidl, Á. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12467 · Cited by 107
Self-citationLiquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed
Shimer, R. J., & Werning, I. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11689 · Cited by 50
Borrowing constraints, the cost of precautionary saving and unemployment insurance
Crossley, T. F., & Low, H. W. (2017) · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2005.0502 · Cited by 19
A Bound on Risk Aversion Using Labor Supply Elasticities
Chetty, R. (2006) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w12067 · Cited by 15
Self-citationWhy do Unemployment Benefits Raise Unemployment Durations? Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity
Chetty, R. (2005) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w11760 · Cited by 13
Self-citation
Cited by
Logs with Zeros? Some Problems and Solutions
Chen, J., & Roth, J. (2024) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjad054 · Cited by 970
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Chetty, R. (2008) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/588585 · Cited by 853
Self-citationSufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods
Chetty, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142910 · Cited by 666
Self-citationCash-on-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market
Card, D., Chetty, R., & Weber, A. (2007) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2007.122.4.1511 · Cited by 441
Self-citationConsumer Spending during Unemployment: Positive and Normative Implications
Ganong, P., & Noel, P. (2019) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20170537 · Cited by 433
Metadata
- Authors
- Chetty, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2006-11
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 10-11
- Pages
- 1879-1901
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3024062560
- Cited by
- 361
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 17.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.