The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets
Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of optimal minimum wage policy in a perfectly competitive labor market and obtains two key results. First, we show that a binding minimum wage – while leading to unemployment – is nevertheless desirable if the government values redistribution toward low wage workers and if unemployment induced by the minimum wage hits the lowest surplus workers first. Importantly, this result remains true in the presence of optimal nonlinear taxes and transfers. In that context, a binding minimum wage enhances the effectiveness of transfers to low-skilled workers as it prevents low-skilled wages from falling through incidence effects. Second, when labor supply responses are along the extensive margin only, which is the empirically relevant case, the co-existence of a minimum wage with a positive tax rate on low-skilled work is always (second-best) Pareto inefficient. A Pareto improving policy consists of reducing the pre-tax minimum wage while keeping constant the post-tax minimum wage by increasing transfers to low-skilled workers, and financing this reform by increasing taxes on higher paid workers. Those results imply that the minimum wage and subsidies for low-skilled workers are complementary policies.
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Citations
Cites
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296779 · Cited by 4,510
Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation
Stiglitz, J. E. (1982) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(82)90020-2 · Cited by 761
Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., & Saez, E. (2009) · doi:10.3386/w15218 · Cited by 88
Self-citation
Cited by
Effects of the minimum wage on employment dynamics
Meer, J., & West, J. (2016) · Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.3368/jhr.51.2.0414-6298r1 · Cited by 446
Who Pays for the Minimum Wage?
Harasztosi, P., & Lindner, A. (2019) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20171445 · Cited by 301
Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2013) · Handbook of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53759-1.00007-8 · Cited by 290
Self-citationEffects of the Minimum Wage on Employment Dynamics
Meer, J., & West, J. (2013) · doi:10.3386/w19262 · Cited by 43
Metadata
- Authors
- Lee, D., & Saez, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-10
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 9-10
- Pages
- 739-749
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2122024905
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 21.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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