The survival of the conformist: Social pressure and renewable resource management
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper examines the role of other-regarding behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource, we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.
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Citations
Cites
A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems
Ostrom, E. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1172133 · Cited by 8,656 · cited 1×
“Among the more relevant factors affecting compliance in Danish fisheries, Raakjær and Mathiesen (2003) found the following: the economic gains to be obtained from noncompliance, deterrence and sanctioning costs, and the presence of ‘‘norms (behavior of other fishers) and morals’’.”
BackgroundSocial Influence: Compliance and Conformity
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142015 · Cited by 6,077 · cited 1×
“(2008), respectively, suggest that both are relevant, while contributions from social psychology (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004) and the empirical literature on the commons (Ostrom et al.”
BackgroundFive Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War
Choi, J.-K., & Bowles, S. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1144237 · Cited by 1,227
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2002) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00027 · Cited by 1,061
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1177418 · Cited by 715
The Role of International Carbon Offsets in a Second-Best Climate Policy: A Numerical Evaluation
De Cian, E., & Tavoni, M. (2010) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1594699 · Cited by 51
Cited by
Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks
Tilman, A. R., Plotkin, J. B., & Akçay, E. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-14531-6 · Cited by 337
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x · Cited by 277
Elshafei, Y., Sivapalan, M., Tonts, M., & Hipsey, M. R. (2014) · Hydrology and Earth System Sciences · doi:10.5194/hess-18-2141-2014 · Cited by 261
A bottom-up institutional approach to cooperative governance of risky commons
Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2013) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/nclimate1927 · Cited by 183
Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons
Schlüter, M., Tavoni, A., & Levin, S. (2016) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2015.2431 · Cited by 68
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Tavoni, A., Schlüter, M., & Levin, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-04
- Volume
- 299
- Pages
- 152-161
- ISSN
- 0022-5193 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2742987999
- Cited by
- 144
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 18.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.