Why Social Preferences Matter – the Impact of non‐Selfish Motives on Competition, Cooperation and Incentives
Abstract
A substantial number of people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solely motivated by material self‐interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs of relevant reference agents. We show empirically that economists fail to understand fundamental economic questions when they disregard social preferences, in particular, that without taking social preferences into account, it is not possible to understand adequately (i) effects of competition on market outcomes, (ii) laws governing cooperation and collective action, (iii) effects and the determinants of material incentives, (iv) which contracts and property rights arrangements are optimal, and (v) important forces shaping social norms and market failures.
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Punishment can override altruistic motives, leading individuals to free ride as soon as the opportunity arises to evade punishment.
“Overall, punishment can override altruistic motives, leading individuals to free ride as soon as the opportunity arises to evade punishment45–47.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [47]
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- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-03-01
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 478
- Pages
- C1-C33
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0297
- OpenAlex
- W3123067304
- Cited by
- 1,061
- References
- 112
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 47 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 39 · 2022: 46 · 2021: 46 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 61 · 2017: 39 · 2016: 42 · 2015: 51 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 52 · 2012: 45
- FWCI
- 172.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Economic Journal (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- social preferences, altruism, competition, cooperation, collective action, incentives, contracts, property rights, social norms, market failure, self-interest
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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