Thalamic contributions to the state and contents of consciousness
Open accessAbstract
Consciousness can be conceptualized as varying along at least two dimensions: the global state of consciousness and the content of conscious experience. Here, we highlight the cellular and systems-level contributions of the thalamus to conscious state and then argue for thalamic contributions to conscious content, including the integrated, segregated, and continuous nature of our experience. We underscore vital, yet distinct roles for core- and matrix-type thalamic neurons. Through reciprocal interactions with deep-layer cortical neurons, matrix neurons support wakefulness and determine perceptual thresholds, whereas the cortical interactions of core neurons maintain content and enable perceptual constancy. We further propose that conscious integration, segregation, and continuity depend on the convergent nature of corticothalamic projections enabling dimensionality reduction, a thalamic reticular nucleus-mediated divisive normalization-like process, and sustained coherent activity in thalamocortical loops, respectively. Overall, we conclude that the thalamus plays a central topological role in brain structures controlling conscious experience.
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Feedback loops between non-lemniscal thalamus and distal compartments might allow internal states to shape sensory perception by integrating and modulating sensory signals.
“These projections to the non-lemniscal thalamus and subsequent feedback to the distal compartments may enable integration and modulation of sensory information based on internal states, ultimately shaping sensory perception [44].”
From Testing circuit-level theories of consciousness in humans (2026) · cites this paper as [44]
In “Thalamocortical microcircuit contributions to conscious state” (page unavailable), the paper describes higher-order matrix thalamic projections returning to cortical apical dendrites. “Thalamus Gates the Threshold for Conscious Contents” links a re-entrant loop involving those dendrites to changes in sensory detection thresholds. It does not specifically establish that the loop integrates sensory signals according to internal states, so that part of the claim goes beyond the cited passages. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredMany current theories and adversarial collaborations do not explicitly say how subcortical structures such as the thalamus contribute to conscious states and contents, even though the thalamus is known to be important.
“while contemporary theories [2,3] and recent adversarial collaborations [49] often omit explicit claims about how subcortical structures like the thalamus support conscious states and content (but see [4,31,50–52]) despite its known importance [40,44,53–55]”
From Testing circuit-level theories of consciousness in humans (2026) · cites this paper as [44]
The coupling compartment controls feedforward-feedback interactions and is driven and gated by higher-order thalamic nuclei.
“The coupling compartment, which regulates the interaction between feedforward (somatic) and feedback (apical) signals, receives synaptic input from (and is gated by) higher-order (HO) thalamic nuclei, including posteromedial nucleus (connected with somatosensory and motor cortex), dorsal and medial divisions of the medial geniculate body (connected with auditory cortex) [56,57] and the pulvinar (c”
From Testing circuit-level theories of consciousness in humans (2026) · cites this paper as [44]
Despite convincing causal evidence for the role of the Central Thalamus in regulating arousal and consciousness, a mechanistic understanding remains elusive.
“Despite the convincing causal evidence for the role of the Central Thalamus in regulating arousal and consciousness, a mechanistic understanding remains elusive 14,16,30 .”
From Thalamic oscillations distinguish natural states of consciousness in humans (2026) · cites this paper as [16]
The Central Thalamus has been shown to play a key role in arousal regulation.
“The Central Thalamus has been shown to play a key role in arousal regulation 14,16 .”
From Thalamic oscillations distinguish natural states of consciousness in humans (2026) · cites this paper as [16]
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References 193 · Cited by 105
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- [34]Jones EG (2007). The thalamus (Cambridge University Press).
- [58]Buzsáki G. (2006). Rhythms of the Brain (Oxford university press).
- [62]Singer W. (2011). Consciousness and neuronal synchronization. In The neurology of consciousness, Giulio Tononi SL, ed. (Elsevier Science), pp. 43– 52.
- [129]Harris KD, and Shepherd GMG (2015). The Neocortical Circuit: Themes and Variations. Nat. Neurosci 18, 170– 181. 25622573 PMC4889215
- [140]Hohwy J. (2013). The Predictive Mind (OUP Oxford).
- [144]Overgaard M. (2015). Behavioural Methods in Consciousness Research (Oxford University Press).
- Authors
- Whyte, C. J., Redinbaugh, M. J., Shine, J. M., & Saalmann, Y. B.
- Affiliations
- The University of Sydney (AU)
- Stanford University (US)
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Redinbaugh, Michelle J.
- Venue
- Neuron
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2024-05
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 1611-1625
- ISSN
- 0896-6273 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC11537458
- OpenAlex
- W4396916382
- Cited by
- 105
- References
- 193
- Citations by year
- 2026: 53 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 10 · 2022: 1
- FWCI
- 7.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Neuron (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- National Institutes of Health (P51OD011106)
- National Institute of Mental Health (F32MH134451)
- National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (R01NS117901)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- thalamus, consciousness, states of consciousness, conscious content, corticothalamic projections, thalamocortical loop, reticular nucleus, divisive normalization, perceptual thresholds, perceptual constancy, wakefulness, dimensionality reduction
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Cerebral Cortex, Consciousness, Humans, Neural Pathways, Neurons, Thalamus, Wakefulness
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