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Cited by 3Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceNeural dynamics and brain functionFunctional Brain Connectivity Studies

Testing circuit-level theories of consciousness in humans

Open access
Dykstra, Andrew R., Zhu, Yunkai, Fernandez Pujol, Carolina, Zhou, David W., Jones, Stephanie R., Marvan, Tomáš, Bonaiuto, James J.·2026·Trends in Cognitive Sciences
DOI 10.1016/j.tics.2025.08.012PMC PMC12495894
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Abstract

Our understanding of the neural basis of consciousness is mostly restricted to large-scale brain activity patterns as measured by methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magneto/electro-encephalography (M/EEG). In contrast, we lack even basic understanding of circuit-level mechanisms supporting consciousness - particularly in humans - despite the fundamental role that such mechanisms likely play in instantiating larger-scale brain activity patterns supporting conscious states and contents. Here, we review what progress has been made on circuit-level theories of consciousness (e.g., apical amplification theory, dendritic integration theory) and argue that such theories can be tested in humans using recently developed, state-of-the-art methods. Doing so will further facilitate translation of consciousness science into clinical settings and strengthen the bridge between circuit- and network-level theories of consciousness.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.tics.2025.08.012

Cites

143 of 143 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

42 of 71 cited sources checked · 26 supported · 1 flagged · accuracy not yet measured

  • Premisecitation

    DIT proposes three compartments in L5b pyramidal neurons: AAT's two integration zones plus a middle coupling compartment.

    “In contrast, DIT posits three distinct compartments within L5b PNs: the same two zones of integration as AAT plus an intermediate, “coupling compartment” [15].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [15] source

      Section 4.1 (pp. 10–11) describes two functionally distinct integration sites in L5 pyramidal neurons—the apical and somatic compartments—and says their interaction is controlled. Section 4.2 (p. 12) likewise discusses coupling between those two compartments, not a third intermediate compartment. (LLM, conf=0.90)

      Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Premisecitation

    Animal studies using proxies for consciousness have highlighted certain neuron classes, layer-spanning elements, and cortical circuits.

    “work in animal models using methods that can serve as proxies for consciousness (e.g. anesthesia, perceptual detection) has emphasized the importance of certain classes of neurons [7–9], layer-spanning neuronal elements [10], and cortical circuits [11].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [7] source
    • cites [8] source
    • cites [9] source
    • cites [10] source
      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [11] source

      The section ‘A disinhibitory motif’ (page unavailable) reviews evidence from behaving mice for a cortical circuit involving distinct interneuron types, supporting the part attributed to [11] about cortical circuits. It does not characterize those experiments as using proxies for consciousness, such as anesthesia or perceptual detection. The neuron-class and layer-spanning claims are attached to other citations, not this one. (LLM, conf=0.78)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • Rests on an assumption: Animal models using anesthesia and perceptual detection can serve as proxies for consciousness.
  • Premisecitation

    Many current theories and adversarial collaborations do not explicitly say how subcortical structures such as the thalamus contribute to conscious states and contents, even though the thalamus is known to be important.

    “while contemporary theories [2,3] and recent adversarial collaborations [49] often omit explicit claims about how subcortical structures like the thalamus support conscious states and content (but see [4,31,50–52]) despite its known importance [40,44,53–55]”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim6 of 8 sources checked
    • cites [2] source

      The available overview passage (section and page not provided) identifies four contemporary approaches to consciousness but does not say whether they omit explicit accounts of the thalamus or other subcortical structures. Searches for “thalamus,” “subcortical,” and “adversarial collaborations” found no passage addressing that omission. The separately cited claims about collaborations and the thalamus’s importance are not attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.72)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [3] source
    • cites [49] source
    • cites [40] source
    • cites [44] source
    • cites [53] source
    • cites [54] source
    • cites [55] source
  • Interpretationreasoning

    Some aspects of these circuit-level theories can be tested in people with modern methods such as laminar MEG, high-field MRI, biophysical modeling, and invasive recordings from neurosurgical patients.

    “Here, we argue that certain aspects of such circuit-level theories can be tested in humans (where consciousness is easiest to query) using state-of-the-art methods including laminar MEG [20], high-field MRI [21–23], biophysical modeling [24], and invasive recordings in human neurosurgical patients [25,26].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [20]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [21] source
    • cites [22] source
    • cites [23] source
    • cites [24] source
    • Rests on an assumption: Consciousness is easiest to query in humans.
  • Interpretationcitation

    Feedback loops between non-lemniscal thalamus and distal compartments might allow internal states to shape sensory perception by integrating and modulating sensory signals.

    “These projections to the non-lemniscal thalamus and subsequent feedback to the distal compartments may enable integration and modulation of sensory information based on internal states, ultimately shaping sensory perception [44].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [44] source

      In “Thalamocortical microcircuit contributions to conscious state” (page unavailable), the paper describes higher-order matrix thalamic projections returning to cortical apical dendrites. “Thalamus Gates the Threshold for Conscious Contents” links a re-entrant loop involving those dendrites to changes in sensory detection thresholds. It does not specifically establish that the loop integrates sensory signals according to internal states, so that part of the claim goes beyond the cited passages. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • May combine two claims. 23
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 15

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    This work grounded NCC research in systems physiology and inspired circuit-level theories including AAT and DIT.

    “This work, which remains critical, has both grounded the study of NCCs in systems physiology and inspired novel, circuit-level theories of consciousness such as apical amplification theory (AAT) [12–14] and dendritic integration theory (DIT) [15–17]”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 6 sources checked
    • cites [12] source
    • cites [13] source
    • cites [14]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [15]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [16] source
    • cites [17]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    This arrangement could underlie the functions proposed by AAT and DIT and may also support other cognitive phenomena.

    “This organization, with clear separation of input streams, provides a mechanistic basis for the functions proposed by circuit-level theories like AAT and DIT, and may also equip them with the machinery necessary to implement a range of other cognitive phenomena (e.g. cognitive penetrability, selective attention, etc.) [10,14].”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked
    • cites [10] source

      In “Combining the Components and Connectivity in a Description of the Cortex” (page unavailable), the paper proposes that pyramidal neurons could associate feed-forward and feedback inputs arriving at different layers, but calls this mechanism a hypothesis whose operation remains an open question. The fMRI case-study section discusses top-down effects on perception and attention. Our copy does not connect the proposed mechanism to AAT or DIT by name, or address cognitive penetrability specifically. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [14]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Anesthesia disrupts neuromodulatory signals that normally help couple apical and somatic compartments, mainly affecting apical dendrites.

    “the disruption of neuromodulatory activity by anesthesia, which normally facilitates functional coupling between apical and somatic compartments, primarily affecting the apical dendrites [62]”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [62] source

      The Introduction (page unavailable) says adrenergic arousal regulates interactions between somatic and apical integration zones. The section on wakefulness, sleep, and anesthesia (page unavailable) reports that anesthetics interfere with the modulatory effects of apical input. It does not establish that anesthesia disrupts neuromodulatory signals themselves; it describes interference with apical modulation, including suppression of Ih currents by some anesthetics. (LLM, conf=0.84)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Under anesthesia, feedforward sensory processing continues, suggesting somatic input remains but apical modulation needed for conscious perception is impaired.

    “the observation that feedforward sensory processing persists under anesthesia, indicating intact somatic input but impaired apical modulation necessary for conscious perception [15]”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The distal compartment gets signals from neuromodulatory sources, other cortical regions, and non-lemniscal thalamus.

    “the distal compartment receives input from neuromodulatory centers [36], other cortical areas [37–39], and the non-lemniscal thalamus [40,41]”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim6 of 6 sources checked
    • cites [36] source
    • cites [37] source
    • cites [38] source
    • cites [39] source
    • cites [40] source

      The citation is attached to the non-lemniscal thalamus clause, not the claims about neuromodulatory centers or other cortical areas. The Introduction (page unavailable) says the central lateral thalamic nucleus projects to superficial cortical layers, supporting a thalamic input to superficial cortex. The paper does not establish that this input reaches the distal compartment specifically. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [41] source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisecitation

    DIT and earlier work repeatedly stress content matching between the two streams.

    “In contrast, DIT and its antecedents [58] repeatedly emphasize a match in content between the two streams [15,16,19]”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 4 sources checked
    • cites [58] source
    • cites [15]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [16] source
    • cites [19] source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    AAT and DIT both fit the context-sensitive two-point neuron framework: L5b pyramidal neurons have two separate integration sites, not one integrate-and-fire site, and apical dendritic input matters for conscious contents.

    “First, both AAT and DIT align with the “context-sensitive two-point neuron” framework [14,45–47], emphasizing that L5b PNs possess two distinct integration sites, rather than a single integrate-and-fire mechanism, and both emphasize the role of input to the apical dendrites of L5b PNs in conscious contents.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 4 sources checked
    • cites [14]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [45] source
    • cites [46] source
    • cites [47] source

      The Introduction describes apical amplification and dendritic integration theory as multicompartment approaches distinct from a single integrate-and-fire point neuron. The Materials and Methods section describes separate apical and basal integration zones, and the Results link their coordinated input to conscious perceptual content. The paper calls these cells layer-5 pyramidal neurons (L5p), however, and does not establish the claim’s more specific L5b designation. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    The coupling compartment controls feedforward-feedback interactions and is driven and gated by higher-order thalamic nuclei.

    “The coupling compartment, which regulates the interaction between feedforward (somatic) and feedback (apical) signals, receives synaptic input from (and is gated by) higher-order (HO) thalamic nuclei, including posteromedial nucleus (connected with somatosensory and motor cortex), dorsal and medial divisions of the medial geniculate body (connected with auditory cortex) [56,57] and the pulvinar (c”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [56] source

      The Introduction (page unavailable) says the dorsal MGB is connected with auditory cortex and the medial MGB projects broadly across auditory cortical areas. The section “The Medial Division of the MGB” also describes medial-division projections to cortical layer 1. Neither passage establishes that a coupling compartment regulates feedforward–feedback interactions or that these nuclei gate it. (LLM, conf=0.84)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [57] source

      The section ‘Evidence for Top-Down Transthalamic Pathways’ (page unavailable) describes input from higher-order auditory thalamus to layer 1 of primary auditory cortex, supporting the connection to auditory cortex. The paper does not identify a ‘coupling compartment’ or say that higher-order thalamic nuclei gate interactions between somatic feedforward and apical feedback signals. (LLM, conf=0.82)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [44] source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Apical dendrite current direction reflects whether synaptic input is distal or proximal and may also reveal secondary events like voltage-gated dendritic calcium spikes.

    “the direction of current flow in apical dendrites directly reflects synaptic input to either distal (i.e. apical) or proximal (i.e. perisomatic) locations [66–68], and may also be sensitive to secondary events such voltage-gated dendritic calcium spikes (critical to both AAT and DIT), which can be triggered both by excitatory synaptic input to the apical dendrites or by certain back-propagated so”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 5 sources checked
    • cites [66] source

      The M135 origin section links upward apical-dendrite current to proximal excitatory input and downward current to distal apical input, while also identifying back-propagation and repolarization as causes of current flow. The Computational neural model section includes a calcium current, but our copy does not establish that current direction reveals voltage-gated dendritic calcium spikes. No page numbers were supplied for these passages. (LLM, conf=0.85)

      Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
    • cites [67] source
    • cites [68] source
    • cites [69] source
    • cites [70] source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    These events affect local field potentials and electrocorticography, possibly in humans, so M/EEG might detect them, as biophysical modeling supports.

    “The fact that such events contribute to local field potentials and electrocorticography signals [71], including potentially from humans [72], suggests that such events may be observable with M/EEG, an idea that is also supported by biophysical modeling [73,74].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 4 sources checked
    • cites [71] source
    • cites [72] source
    • cites [73] source
    • cites [74] source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisenone given

    Inferring consciousness in experimental animals is difficult.

    “consciousness is difficult to infer in experimental animals”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisenone given

    Current knowledge of the neural basis of consciousness comes mainly from large-scale methods such as fMRI and M/EEG.

    “To date, our understanding of this question has come mostly from large-scale methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magneto-/electro-encephalography (M/EEG).”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Measuring microscale neural activity in humans is difficult.

    “microscale neural activity is difficult to measure in humans”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    AAT and DIT can both accommodate BAC firing as a way to modulate or amplify sensory signals in L5b pyramidal neurons.

    “Second, both AAT and DIT are compatible with the involvement of backpropagation-activated calcium-spike (BAC) firing [48] as a mechanism for modulating or amplifying sensory information within L5b PNs”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [48] source

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

    Premisereasoning

    DIT holds that proximal-distal coupling is required for consciousness.

    “DIT posits that this coupling between proximal and distal compartments is necessary for consciousness.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    This disputes the idea that particular cortical areas alone suffice for consciousness and instead stresses interaction with non-lemniscal thalamic nuclei.

    “This challenges the notion that specific cortical areas, per se, are sufficient for consciousness, instead emphasizing the interaction with non-lemniscal thalamic nuclei.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    The apical integration zone gets varied inputs and makes calcium spikes that boost feedforward signals reaching basal dendrites in the somatic integration zone.

    “The “apical integration zone”, characterized by a high density of dendritic spines, receives diverse input (e.g., non-lemniscal thalamus, higher-order cortex, and neuromodulators) and generates calcium spikes that amplify feedforward input arriving at the basal dendrites in the “somatic integration zone”.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    AAT focuses on apical amplification and how it modulates L5b pyramidal neuron output.

    “AAT, conversely, centers on the mechanism of apical amplification and its role in modulating the output of L5b PNs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    L5b pyramidal neurons possess broad dendritic arbors that span layers and receive varied synaptic inputs.

    “These neurons have extensive, layer-spanning dendritic arbors and integrate diverse synaptic inputs.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    DIT claims that cortical feedforward processing without apical feedback is non-conscious, and it applies this to all L5b pyramidal neurons.

    “DIT posits that feedforward cortical processing decoupled from apical feedback is non-conscious, a mechanism it generalizes across all L5b PNs.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisenone given

    AAT and DIT each specify mechanistic roles for thalamus and its parts.

    “both AAT and DIT outline specific mechanistic roles for the thalamus and its subdivisions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationreasoning

    These theories and methods can also bridge separate lines of systems neuroscience research.

    “the same theories/methods can also help connect seemingly disparate (but ultimately aligned) lines of work in systems neuroscience.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Some progress is already being made in testing circuit-level theories in humans.

    “We further argue that some progress is already being made”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    Both AAT and DIT generate testable predictions.

    “Both AAT and DIT generate testable predictions.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisenone given

    AAT proposes that apical inputs boost sensory signals without changing the information those neurons carry.

    “It proposes that apical inputs selectively boost the incoming sensory signals without altering the information carried by those neurons.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisenone given

    In AAT, 'match' mainly means that apical and somatic inputs coincide in time.

    “AAT’s ‘match’ refers primarily to the temporal coincidence of apical and somatic inputs.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    DIT mainly addresses states of consciousness, whereas AAT mainly addresses contents.

    “the primary focus of the DIT literature has been states, while the primary focus of the AAT literature has been contents”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    AAT and DIT emphasize how different dendritic compartments interact, especially how sensory input at the perisomatic region combines with context-sensitive apical amplification, which they propose produces conscious perception.

    “Rather, AAT and DIT focus on the functional roles of distinct dendritic compartments and their interactions, specifically, the interaction between sensory-specific input to the perisomatic compartment and the amplificatory effects of context-sensitive input to the apical compartment, which they propose underlies conscious perception.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Takahashi et al. found that reducing apical dendritic activity in mouse somatosensory cortex reduced apical feedback amplification of feedforward input and impaired whisker-detection awareness.

    “Takahashi et al. [7] showed that suppressing apical dendritic activity in the mouse somatosensory cortex suppressed the amplification of feedforward sensory input by apical feedback, disrupting sensory awareness, as measured by whisker deflection detection.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [7] source

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisereasoning

    AAT treats this amplification as required for conscious processing.

    “AAT holds this amplification to be necessary for conscious processing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisereasoning

    For conscious states, AAT highlights neuromodulatory apical signals that control apical dendrite excitability and thereby wakefulness.

    “Regarding conscious states, AAT emphasizes neuromodulatory apical influences (e.g., from cholinergic and aminergic systems), which regulate the excitability of apical dendrites. This regulation directly modulates levels of wakefulness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    M/EEG mainly captures dendritic currents (MEG) and postsynaptic potentials (EEG) from the same pyramidal cells in AAT/DIT, with dendrites perpendicular to the cortical surface.

    “M/EEG signals primarily reflect dendritic currents (MEG) and associated postsynaptic potentials (EEG) of the same pyramidal cells featured in AAT/DIT and whose dendrites are oriented perpendicular to the cortical surface [63–65].”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [63] source
    • cites [64] source
    • cites [65] source

  • May combine two claims.

    Premisereasoning

    New high-precision MEG and high-field fMRI allow non-invasive laminar-resolution measurements, which are needed to test AAT and DIT layer-specific predictions.

    “recent advances in high-precision MEG and high-field fMRI now enable non-invasive investigations of neural activity with laminar resolution, which are critical for testing the layer-specific predictions of AAT and DIT.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    With invasive recordings, computational methods, and animal models, these advances create new ways to test circuit-level theories in humans and link them to network-level theories.

    “Particularly when complemented by invasive recordings in neurosurgical patients, computational methods like biophysical modeling, and work in animal models (rodents and non-human primates, in particular), such developments offer novel opportunities for testing circuit-level theories of conscious processing in humans and connecting such findings to network-level theories.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
34 of 34

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Circuit-level mechanisms play a fundamental role in instantiating larger-scale brain activity patterns that support conscious states and contents.

    “despite the fundamental role that such mechanisms likely play in instantiating larger-scale brain activity patterns supporting conscious states and contents.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Consciousness is easiest to query in humans.

    “where consciousness is easiest to query”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Animal models using anesthesia and perceptual detection can serve as proxies for consciousness.

    “work in animal models using methods that can serve as proxies for consciousness (e.g. anesthesia, perceptual detection)”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Current evidence supports both AAT and DIT without distinguishing between them.

    “as current evidence supports both indiscriminately.”
4 of 4

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Szul, 2025, Beyond deep versus superficial: true laminar inference with MEG, bioRxiv
  2. Westerberg, 2025, Sensory responses of visual cortical neurons are not prediction errors, bioRxiv

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Related

Authors
Dykstra, A. R., Zhu, Y., Fernandez Pujol, C., Zhou, D. W., Jones, S. R., Marvan, T., & Bonaiuto, J. J.
Affiliations
  • University of Central Florida (US)
  • Brown University (US)
  • University of West Bohemia in Pilsen (CZ)
  • Lyon 1 Université (FR)
Corresponding author
Dykstra, Andrew R.
ORCID
Venue
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2026-03
Volume
30
Issue
3
Pages
226-238
ISSN
1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.tics.2025.08.012
PMC
PMC12495894
OpenAlex
W4414422761
Cited by
3
References
141
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 1
FWCI
0.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (U24NS129945)
  • HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council (864550)
  • Foundation for Hearing (RD-2022-03)
  • National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders (R21DC020295)
  • University of Central Florida (CZ.02.01.01/00/23_025/0008715)
  • European Research Council
  • Ministry of Education Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Functional Brain Connectivity Studies
Keywords
consciousness, neural basis of consciousness, neural circuits, human consciousness
MeSH terms
Brain, Consciousness, Humans, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Models, Neurological, Nerve Net

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