Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in “theory of mind”: Neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Perspective taking is a crucial ability that guides our social interactions. In this study, we show how the specific patterns of errors of brain-damaged patients in perspective taking tasks can help us further understand the factors contributing to perspective taking abilities. Previous work [e.g., Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Chiavarino, C., & Humphreys, G. W. (2004). Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone else's belief. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 499-500; Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Kathirgamanathan, U., & Humphreys, G. W. (2005). Seeing it my way: A case of a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. Brain, 128, 1102-1111] distinguished two components of perspective taking: the ability to inhibit our own perspective and the ability to infer someone else's perspective. We assessed these components using a new nonverbal false belief task which provided different response options to detect three types of response strategies that participants might be using: a complete and spared belief reasoning strategy, a reality-based response selection strategy in which participants respond from their own perspective, and a simplified mentalising strategy in which participants avoid responding from their own perspective but rely on inaccurate cues to infer the other person's belief. One patient, with a self-perspective inhibition deficit, almost always used the reality-based response strategy; in contrast, the other patient, with a deficit in taking other perspectives, tended to use the simplified mentalising strategy without necessarily transposing her own perspective. We discuss the extent to which the pattern of performance of both patients could relate to their executive function deficit and how it can inform us on the cognitive and neural components involved in belief reasoning.
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Cites
Social perception from visual cues: Role of the STS region
Allison, T., Puce, A., & McCarthy, G. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01501-1 · Cited by 2,461
Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 · Cited by 2,306
Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional Neuroimaging
Saxe, R., Carey, S., & Kanwisher, N. (2004) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142044 · Cited by 726
Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone else's belief
Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Chiavarino, C., & Humphreys, G. W. (2004) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1223 · Cited by 559
Self-citationRowe, A. D., Bullock, P. R., Polkey, C. E., & Morris, R. G. (2001) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/124.3.600 · Cited by 400
Acquired theory of mind impairments in individuals with bilateral amygdala lesions
Stone, V. E., Baron-Cohen, S., Calder, A., Keane, J., & Young, A. (2003) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/s0028-3932(02)00151-3 · Cited by 348
Apperly, I. A., Samson, D., Chiavarino, C., & Humphreys, G. W. (2004) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/0898929042947928 · Cited by 321
Self-citation
Cited by
Seeing it their way: Evidence for rapid and involuntary computation of what other people see.
Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Braithwaite, J. J., Andrews, B. J., & Bodley Scott, S. E. (2010) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance · doi:10.1037/a0018729 · Cited by 733
Self-citationTheory of mind and neurodevelopmental disorders of childhood
KORKMAZ, B. (2011) · Pediatric Research · doi:10.1203/pdr.0b013e318212c177 · Cited by 249
“For example, when making judgments about the mental states of others, interference from self-perspective must be resisted (106,107).”
BackgroundInability to empathize: brain lesions that disrupt sharing and understanding another’s emotions.
Hillis, A. E. (2014) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awt317 · Cited by 158
Acute lesions that impair affective empathy
Leigh, R., Oishi, K., Hsu, J., Lindquist, M., Gottesman, R. F., Jarso, S., Crainiceanu, C., Mori, S., & Hillis, A. E. (2013) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awt177 · Cited by 148
Functional neuroimaging of theory of mind
Koster-Hale, J., & Saxe, R. (2013) · Understanding Other Minds · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199692972.003.0009 · Cited by 104
Metadata
- Authors
- Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., & Humphreys, G. W.
- Venue
- Neuropsychologia
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 2561-2569
- ISSN
- 0028-3932 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2021147489
- Cited by
- 75
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 5.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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