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Innocent intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity☆
Abstract
Contemporary moral psychology often emphasizes the universality of moral judgments. Across age, gender, religion and ethnicity, people's judgments on classic dilemmas are sensitive to the same moral principles. In many cases, moral judgments depend not only on the outcome of the action, but on the agent's beliefs and intentions at the time of action. For example, we blame agents who attempt but fail to harm others, while generally forgiving agents who harm others accidentally and unknowingly. Nevertheless, as we report here, there are individual differences in the extent to which observers exculpate agents for accidental harms. Furthermore, we find that the extent to which innocent intentions are taken to mitigate blame for accidental harms is correlated with activation in a specific brain region during moral judgment. This brain region, the right temporo-parietal junction, has been previously implicated in reasoning about other people's thoughts, beliefs, and intentions in moral and non-moral contexts.
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“Activity in the RTPJ while participants make moral judgments about attempted and accidental harms shows the same asymmetry: greater activity for attempted than accidental harms (9, 10, 24, 25).”
From Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments (2010) · cites this paper as [24]
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ResultAn fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment
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BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationCan cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging data?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Young, L., & Saxe, R.
- Affiliations
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Corresponding author
- Young, Liane
- Venue
- Neuropsychologia
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2009-08
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 2065-2072
- ISSN
- 0028-3932 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2104698746
- Semantic Scholar
- c2b5c3e3d88e1e12a3dacfb86b433205fa758d50
- Cited by
- 249
- References
- 67
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 42 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 17 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 17
- FWCI
- 7.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Neuropsychologia (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Forgiveness and Related Behaviors
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Keywords
- accidental harm, moral judgment, intention, forgiveness, blame, right temporoparietal junction, individual differences, moral reasoning, theory of mind
- MeSH terms
- Accidents, Adolescent, Brain, Brain Mapping, Female, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Judgment, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Morals, Oxygen, Reaction Time, Statistics as Topic, Imaging, Three-Dimensional, Intention, Young Adult
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