Societal threat and cultural variation in the strength of social norms: An evolutionary basis
Open accessIntegrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
During warfare, disease outbreaks, or resource scarcity, societies are faced with increased coordination pressures across diverse populations of unrelated individuals.
“During warfare, disease outbreaks, or resource scarcity, societies are faced with increased coordination pressures across diverse populations of unrelated individuals [27–28].”
From Ecological and cultural factors underlying the global distribution of prejudice (2019) · cites this paper as [28]
Cultural tightness emerges following threat because it curbs defection and increases coordination.
“Evolutionary game theory models and behavioral data suggest that cultural tightness emerges following threat because it curbs defection and increases coordination [28–29].”
From Ecological and cultural factors underlying the global distribution of prejudice (2019) · cites this paper as [28]
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 132 · Cited by 232
- Authors
- Roos, P., Gelfand, M., Nau, D., & Lun, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Maryland, College Park (US)
- Corresponding author
- Roos, Patrick
- Venue
- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-07
- Volume
- 129
- Pages
- 14-23
- ISSN
- 0749-5978 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W652324315
- Cited by
- 232
- References
- 132
- Citations by year
- 2026: 13 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 50 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 51.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- U.S. Army Research Laboratory (W911NF-08-1-0144)
- U.S. Army Research Office (W911NF-11-1-0344)
- U.S. Air Force (FA9550-12-1-0021, FA955-01-41-0020)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Cultural Differences and Values
- Keywords
- social norms, societal threats, cultural variation, norm strength, rule compliance, cooperation norms, evolutionary game theory, cross-cultural psychology, cultural adaptation, ecological context
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
