Cited by 708Ethics and Social Impacts of AIFeminist Epistemology and Gender StudiesArtificial Intelligence in Law

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 64 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Algorithmic injustice: a relational ethics approach

Open access
Birhane, Abeba·2021·Patterns

Abstract

It has become trivial to point out that algorithmic systems increasingly pervade the social sphere. Improved efficiency-the hallmark of these systems-drives their mass integration into day-to-day life. However, as a robust body of research in the area of algorithmic injustice shows, algorithmic systems, especially when used to sort and predict social outcomes, are not only inadequate but also perpetuate harm. In particular, a persistent and recurrent trend within the literature indicates that society's most vulnerable are disproportionally impacted. When algorithmic injustice and harm are brought to the fore, most of the solutions on offer (1) revolve around technical solutions and (2) do not center disproportionally impacted communities. This paper proposes a fundamental shift-from rational to relational-in thinking about personhood, data, justice, and everything in between, and places ethics as something that goes above and beyond technical solutions. Outlining the idea of ethics built on the foundations of relationality, this paper calls for a rethinking of justice and ethics as a set of broad, contingent, and fluid concepts and down-to-earth practices that are best viewed as a habit and not a mere methodology for data science. As such, this paper mainly offers critical examinations and reflection and not "solutions."

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Birhane argues that algorithmic injustice is perpetuated by technical fixes that fail to center disproportionately impacted communities, and proposes a shift from rational to relational ethics. Relational ethics grounds justice and ethics in context, history, lived experience, and power asymmetries rather than technical solutions.

Key findings

  • The paper contends that dominant responses to algorithmic harm—such as debiasing datasets and fairness metrics—are inadequate because they treat bias as a static deviation from a “correct” description and obscure structural, historical, and power asymmetries.
  • It proposes four tenets of relational ethics: knowing that centers human relations and the disproportionately impacted; bias is not a deviation from the “correct” description; prioritizing understanding over prediction; and treating data science as a practice that alters the social fabric.
  • It claims marginalized groups are disproportionately harmed by algorithmic systems and hold epistemic privilege to recognize harm, citing examples including object detection, recidivism, gender recognition/classification, and medicine.
  • It calls for ethics as a down-to-earth habit and practice, not a mere methodology or tool, and states that this work is never done.

Methods

  • Design: critical, conceptual, and reflective essay; no empirical study, dataset, or sample is used.
  • Main analysis: comparative and philosophical argument drawing on Afro-feminist epistemology, enactive cognitive science, ubuntu, Bakhtinian dialogism, and complexity science to contrast rationality and relationality.
  • No quantitative analysis or original numerical results are reported.

Limitations

  • The paper states it mainly offers critical examinations and reflection and not “solutions”; it is not a set of general guidelines, principles, or out-of-the-box tools.
  • The paper states relational ethics is not a rationally constructed abstract “theory of ethics” and does not provide implementable remedies.
  • Evident from the text: no empirical validation, case study, or measurement is provided; the framework is conceptual and programmatic.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.patter.2021.100205

Cites

71 of 71 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

60 Not checked yet · 23 No basis given · 17 Own interpretation

Verify all 64 references — free account

Show all 29 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 62
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 19
71 of 71
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Most solutions on offer for algorithmic injustice revolve around technical solutions.

    “most of the solutions on offer (1) revolve around technical solutions”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Most solutions on offer for algorithmic injustice do not center disproportionally impacted communities.

    “and (2) do not center disproportionally impacted communities.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Automated and standardized solutions to complex social issues often contribute more harm than good.

    “automated and standardized solutions to complex and contingent social issues often contribute more harm than good”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Algorithmic systems increasingly pervade the social sphere.

    “algorithmic systems increasingly pervade the social sphere.”
4 of 4

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Citations

Cites

Show all 74 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Descartes, 1984, Vol. 2
  2. Birhane, 2017, Descartes was wrong:‘a person is a person through other persons’, Aeon

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Items 401–500 of 708

Metadata

Authors
Birhane, A.
Affiliations
University College Dublin (IE)
Corresponding author
Birhane, Abeba
Venue
Patterns
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2021-02
Volume
2
Issue
2
Pages
100205
ISSN
2666-3899 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3132771424
Cited by
707
References
74
Citations by year
2026: 251 · 2025: 177 · 2024: 85 · 2023: 94 · 2022: 73 · 2021: 25
FWCI
12.97
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Patterns (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Science Foundation Ireland (13/RC/2094_P2)
  • European Regional Development Fund
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Law › Artificial Intelligence in Law
Keywords
algorithmic injustice, relational ethics, relationality, algorithmic harms, personhood, data ethics, justice

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