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Cited by 170Embodied and Extended CognitionPhenomenology and Existential PhilosophyCybernetics and Technology in Society

The body social: an enactive approach to the self

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Kyselo, Miriam·2014·Frontiers in Psychology
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986PMC PMC4162380
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Abstract

THIS PAPER TAKES A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD QUESTION: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas' notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator.

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  • The self is social through and through-it is co-generated in interactions and relations with others.

    “Kyselo,27 for example, contends that the self is social through and through—it is co-generated in interactions and relations with others.”

    From Algorithmic injustice: A relational ethics approach (2021) · cites this paper as [27]

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1 of the 98 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Bruner J. (1996). The Culture of Eduction. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
  2. Clark A. (2001). Mindware. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  3. Colombetti G. (2014). The Feeling Body. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  4. Trevarthen C. (1993). “The self born in intersubjectivity,” in The Perceived Self: Ecological and Interpersonal Sources of Self-knowledge, ed. Neisser U. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 121– 173

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Authors
Kyselo, M.
Affiliations
University of the Basque Country (ES)
Corresponding author
Kyselo, Miriam
ORCID
Kyselo, Miriam
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2014-09-12
Volume
5
Pages
986-986
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986
PMC
PMC4162380
OpenAlex
W2003763571
Cited by
170
References
98
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 1
FWCI
5.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • Communities in ADDI (Universidad del Pais Vasco) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Communities in ADDI (University of the Basque Country) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • Hispana (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
FP7 People: Marie-Curie Actions (FP7-PEOPLE-2010-ITN, 264828)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
Keywords
self, enactivism, embodiment, social self, interpersonal relationships, individuation, methodological individualism, Hans Jonas, social cognition, cognitive identity

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