Cited by 213Chaos-based Image/Signal EncryptionCryptographic Implementations and SecurityComputer Science and Engineering

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 10 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Optimal quantitative cryptanalysis of permutation-only multimedia ciphers against plaintext attacks

Open access
Li, Chengqing, Lo, Kwok-Tung·2011·Signal Processing

Abstract

In [Pattern Recognition Letters, in press, doi:10.1016/j.patrec.2009.11.008], an image scrambling encryption algorithm of pixel bit based on chaos map was proposed. Considering the algorithm as a typical binary image scrambling/permutation algorithm exerting on plaintext of size M � (8N), this paper proposes a novel optimal method to break it with some known/chosen-plaintexts. The spatial complexity and computational complexity of the attack are only O(32 � MN) and O(16 � n0 � MN) respectively, where n0 is the number of known/chosen-plaintexts used. The method can be easily

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper gives an optimal known/chosen-plaintext cryptanalysis of a chaos-based pixel-bit image permutation cipher and extends it to any permutation-only multimedia cipher. It recovers the equivalent permutation matrix with low spatial and computational complexity and reports experimental recovery on 256×256 images.

Key findings

  • For the binary image permutation algorithm on plaintext size \(M \times (8N)\), the attack needs only \(O(32 \cdot MN)\) spatial complexity and \(O(16 \cdot n_0 \cdot MN)\) computational complexity, where \(n_0\) is the number of known/chosen plaintexts.
  • For any permutation-only scheme on size \(M \times N\) with \(L\) value levels, the attack achieves \(O(MN)\) spatial complexity and \(O(\lceil \log_L(MN)\rceil \cdot MN)\) computational complexity.
  • For 256×256 images, the known-plaintext threshold becomes \(n_0 > \lceil \log_2(2^{19}-1)\rceil = 19\); with 20 known plain-images, the recovered “Peppers” image had \(23509/65536 \approx 35.8\%\) correct pixels but most visual information recovered, and performance was good when \(n_0 \ge 20\).
  • Exact chosen-plaintext recovery requires \(n_c = \lceil \log_2(8MN)\rceil = 3 + \lceil \log_2(MN)\rceil\) chosen plain-images; the paper also notes weaknesses including weak Logistic-map randomness, failure on all-zero/all-255 images, plaintext insensitivity, equivalent subkeys \(x_0\) and \(1-x_0\), unchanged bit histogram, and low efficiency.

Methods

  • The cipher is represented as an \(M \times (8N)\) permutation matrix \(W\); the attack constructs a binary tree from known/chosen plaintext–ciphertext pairs to recover \(W\), then extends this to a multi-branch tree for general \(L\)-level permutation-only schemes.
  • Experiments use randomly selected natural images of size 256×256, with an illustrated key \((x_0,\mu,m,n,T)=(0.2009,3.98,20,51,4)\) and recovered “Peppers” images using estimates \(W_{20}\) and \(W_{25}\), plus a \(3\times3\) median filter.
  • The analysis derives recovery thresholds under a uniform independent-bit assumption and reports spatial/computational complexity for the binary and general cases.

Limitations

  • The paper states no explicit limitations section.
  • Evident from the text: the known-plaintext threshold analysis assumes each bit is uniformly distributed over \(\{0,1\}\) and independent; the authors note natural-image redundancy causes flat performance slopes for \(n_0 \ge 25\) and has two opposite influences on breaking.
  • Evident from the text: experimental validation is mainly on 256×256 natural images with one illustrated secret key, and the attack inherently requires known or chosen plaintext–ciphertext pairs.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.sigpro.2010.09.014

Cites

27 of 27 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

25 Own interpretation · 9 No full text of the sources · 9 No basis given · 2 Own result · 1 Sources not found

Show all 37 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 7
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 2
9 of 9
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    The attacker can obtain some known or chosen plaintexts together with their corresponding ciphertexts encrypted under the same secret key.

    “The known-plaintext attack is an attack model for cryptanalysis where the attacker has some samples of both the plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext and make use of them to reveal secret information, such as secret keys and/or its equivalent ones.”
    “this paper proposes a novel optimal method to break it with some known/chosen-plaintexts.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Each element in B is uniformly distributed over {0,1}.

    “To simplify the analyses, we assume that each element in B distributes uniformly over { 0 , 1 } , and any two elements are independent of each other.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Any two elements in B are independent of each other.

    “To simplify the analyses, we assume that each element in B distributes uniformly over { 0 , 1 } , and any two elements are independent of each other.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Decryption is acceptable when every bit is correctly determined with probability greater than 0.5.

    “Generally speaking, when every bit is determined correctly with a probability larger than a half, namely p b > 0 . 5, the decryption will be acceptable.”
4 of 4

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

3 of 3

Citations

Cites

Show all 26 references

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Items 201–213 of 213

Metadata

Authors
Li, C., & Lo, K.-T.
Affiliations
Hong Kong Polytechnic University (HK)
Corresponding author
Li, Chengqing
Venue
Signal Processing
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2011-04
Volume
91
Issue
4
Pages
949-954
ISSN
0165-1684 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4252343056
Cited by
213
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 20 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 21 · 2017: 27 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 8
FWCI
7.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Signal Processing (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • PolyU Institutional Research Archive (Hong Kong Polytechnic University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Computer Science and Engineering
Keywords
chaotic maps, cryptanalysis, known-plaintext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, attack complexity, multimedia encryption

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