Cited by 849Visual perception and processing mechanismsBayesian Modeling and Causal InferenceAdvanced Vision and Imaging

Vision as Bayesian inference: analysis by synthesis?

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Yuille, Alan, Kersten, Daniel·2006·Trends in Cognitive Sciences

Abstract

We argue that the study of human vision should be aimed at determining how humans perform natural tasks with natural images. Attempts to understand the phenomenology of vision from artificial stimuli, although worthwhile as a starting point, can lead to faulty generalizations about visual systems, because of the enormous complexity of natural images. Dealing with this complexity is daunting, but Bayesian inference on structured probability distributions offers the ability to design theories of vision that can deal with the complexity of natural images, and that use 'analysis by synthesis' strategies with intriguing similarities to the brain. We examine these strategies using recent examples from computer vision, and outline some important implications for cognitive science.

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  • Bayesian probability theory dictates that agents should form and update their beliefs on the basis of not only sensory evidence but also the prior probability of hypotheses about what is currently present in the world.

    “Bayesian probability theory provides a principled way of making such inferences, dictating that agents should form and update their beliefs on the basis of not only the evidence provided by the senses but also the prior probability of the various hypotheses about what is currently present in the world (i.e., expectations) [101].”

    From How Do Expectations Shape Perception? (2018) · cites this paper as [101]

    The Introduction (“Perception as inference,” page unavailable) describes Bayesian visual inference as combining bottom-up processing with a top-down generative component. “The need for Bottom-up and Top-down processing” likewise describes hypotheses informed by image cues and high-level models. These passages support using more than sensory evidence, but the copy does not explicitly state that agents update beliefs using the prior probabilities of hypotheses; its discussion is also principally about vision rather than agents generally. (LLM, conf=0.77)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Bayesian inference is a normative theory, prescribing the best possible inference a system can make given the data.

    “Importantly, Bayesian inference is a normative theory, prescribing the best possible inference a system can make given the data.”

    From How Do Expectations Shape Perception? (2018) · cites this paper as [101]

  • The general motif of these theories is that perceptual inference involves a top-down generative component that predicts and constrains the processing of bottom-up input over time.

    “The general motif of these theories is the notion that perceptual inference involves a top-down generative component that predicts and constrains the processing of bottom-up input over time [101].”

    From How Do Expectations Shape Perception? (2018) · cites this paper as [101]

  • Bayesian models of cognition have primarily flourished as explanations of the complex dependency of behavior on the environment in domains including intuitive physics, causal learning, perception, motor control, and language.

    “Bayesian models of cognition have primarily flourished as explanations of the complex dependency of behavior on the environment in domains including intuitive physics, causal learning, perception, motor control, and language [1-10]”

    From Bayesian Brains without Probabilities (2016) · cites this paper as [10]

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References 39 · Cited by 849

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Chen X & Yuille AL. "Detecting and Reading Text in Natural Scenes". CVPR (2) (2004): 366-373
  2. Dayan, P. and Yu, A. "Norepinephrine and Neural Interrupts" NIPS Advances in Neural Infor- mation Processing Systems 18. 2005.
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  6. Kersten D, & Schrater PW. 2002. Pattern Inference Theory: A Probabilistic Approach to Vision. In Perception and the Physical World, ed. R Mausfeld, & D Heyer. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
  7. Mamassian P, Landy MS, & Maloney LT. (2002). Bayesian modelling of visual perception. In Probabilistic Models of the Brain. R. Rao, B. Olshausen and M. Lewicki (Eds), pp. 13-36. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  8. Palmer SE. Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology pBradford Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 1999.
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Authors
Yuille, A., & Kersten, D.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Los Angeles (US)
  • University of Minnesota (US)
Corresponding author
  • Yuille, Alan
  • Kersten, Daniel
Venue
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2006-07
Volume
10
Issue
7
Pages
301-308
ISSN
1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1533374248
Cited by
849
References
39
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 40 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 48 · 2019: 36 · 2018: 43 · 2017: 50 · 2016: 47 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 41 · 2013: 41 · 2012: 40
FWCI
2.89
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
  • Department of Statistics, UCLA
Funders
  • National Institutes of Health (RO1 EY015261, EY015261)
  • Office of Naval Research (N00014)
  • National Eye Institute (R01EY015261)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Advanced Vision and Imaging
Keywords
Bayesian inference, human vision, analysis-by-synthesis, natural images, visual perception, computational models of vision, artificial stimuli, phenomenology of vision, computer vision
MeSH terms
Algorithms, Bayes Theorem, Brain, Brain Mapping, Field Dependence-Independence, Humans, Markov Chains, Monte Carlo Method, Orientation, Pattern Recognition, Visual, Probability Theory, Vision, Ocular, Visual Pathways, Models, Statistical, Signal Detection, Psychological

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