Cited by 134Taxation and Compliance StudiesEconomic and Fiscal StudiesFiscal Policies and Political Economy

Going Where the Money Is: Strategies for Taxing Economic Elites in Unequal Democracies

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Fairfield, Tasha·2013·World Development

Abstract

How can policymakers circumvent obstacles to taxing economic elites? This question is critical for developing countries, especially in Latin America where strengthening tax capacity depends significantly on tapping under-taxed, highly-concentrated income and profits. Drawing on diverse literatures and extensive fieldwork, the paper identifies six strategies that facilitate enactment of modest tax increases by mobilizing popular support and/or tempering elite antagonism. Case studies from Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia illustrate the effect of these strategies on the fate of tax reform initiatives. The analysis builds theory on tax politics and yields implications for research on reform coalitions and gradual institutional change.

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  • Appendix A exceeds the length of Fairfield's (2013) article, which included three additional case studies; Fairfield's (2015) book includes over 28 case studies.

    “Appendix A, which includes various cross checks to ensure that likelihoods are sensible and reasonably consistent across the problem, exceeds the length of Fairfield's (2013) article, which included three additional case studies; Fairfield's (2015) book includes over 28 case studies.”

    From Explicit Bayesian Analysis for Process Tracing: Guidelines, Opportunities, and Caveats (2017) · cites this paper as Fairfield's (2013)

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  • Some of the hypotheses assessed against Fairfield's (2013) explanation involve causal mechanisms that in the real world could potentially operate simultaneously or in interaction.

    “Some of the hypotheses we assess against Fairfield's (2013) explanation involve causal mechanisms that-in the real world-could potentially operate simultaneously or in interaction.”

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Authors
Fairfield, T.
Affiliations
London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
Corresponding author
Fairfield, Tasha
Venue
World Development
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2013-07
Volume
47
Pages
42-57
ISSN
0305-750X (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2031442581
Cited by
134
References
56
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 29 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1
FWCI
18.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • World Development (publishedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • OpenDocs (Institute of Development Studies) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
Keywords
tax politics, tax reform, tax capacity, elite mobilization, popular support, reform coalitions, gradual institutional change, Latin America, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, developing countries

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