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The essentialist aspect of naive theories
Open accessAbstract
Recent work on children's inferences concerning biological and chemical categories has suggested that children (and perhaps adults) are essentialists - a view known as psychological essentialism. I distinguish three varieties of psychological essentialism and investigate the ways in which essentialism explains the inferences for which it is supposed to account. Essentialism succeeds in explaining the inferences, I argue, because it attributes to the child belief in causal laws connecting category membership and the possession of certain characteristic appearances and behavior. This suggests that the data will be equally well explained by a non-essentialist hypothesis that attributes belief in the appropriate causal laws to the child, but makes no claim as to whether or not the child represents essences. I provide several reasons to think that this non-essentialist hypothesis is in fact superior to any version of the essentialist hypothesis.
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Citations
Cites
Basic objects in natural categories
Rosch, E., Mervis, C. B., Gray, W. D., Johnson, D. M., & Boyes-Braem, P. (1976) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(76)90013-x · Cited by 5,643
Cited by
The Essential Child: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Thought
Gelman, S. A. (2003) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195154061.001.0001 · Cited by 1,247
Machery, E. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001 · Cited by 784
Causal Models: How People Think about the World and Its Alternatives
Sloman, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195183115.001.0001 · Cited by 677
Understanding Natural Selection: Essential Concepts and Common Misconceptions
Gregory, T. R. (2009) · Evolution: Education and Outreach · doi:10.1007/s12052-009-0128-1 · Cited by 563
Psychological essentialism in children
GELMAN, S. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.07.001 · Cited by 492
Metadata
- Authors
- Strevens, M.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2000-02
- Volume
- 74
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 149-175
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982464741
- Cited by
- 193
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 17.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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