Incentive systems in a real effort experiment
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Compared to piece-rate schemes, contests, all-pay auctions, and tournaments result in higher variance in individual effort.
“Compared to piece-rate schemes, contests, all-pay auctions, and tournaments result in higher variance in individual effort (Cason et al., 2010;Dechenaux et al., 2015;van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2001).”
From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2001
The Hypothesis 4 results (p. 23) report significantly greater variability in tournaments than in the piece-rate condition. The cited paper does not establish the same comparison for contests generally or all-pay auctions, which the citing sentence also attributes to its citations. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredEmpirical research on contests and tournaments contradicts Festinger's expectation that underachievers increase effort.
“However, empirical research on contests and tournaments contradicts Festinger's expectation that underachievers increase effort.”
From Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests (2022) · cites this paper as van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2001
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Research works printed but not linked: 12
- Bridger, R.S. and Long, L. (1984). Some cognitive aspects of interface design in a two-variable optimization task. International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 21, 521-539.
- Bull, C., Schotter, A. and Weigelt, K. (1987). Tournaments and piece rates: an experimental study. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1-33.
- Erev, I., Bornstein, G. and Galili, R. (1993). Constructive intergroup competition as a solution to the free rider problem: a field experiment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 29, 463-478.
- Fehr, E. Kirchsteiger G. and Riedle, A. (1993). Does fairness prevent market clearing? an experimental investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 437-459.
- Kandel, E. and Lazear, E.P. (1992). Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political Economy 100, 801-817.
- Knoeber, C.R. and Thurman, W.N. (1994). Testing the theory of tournaments: an empirical analysis of broiler production. Journal of Labor Economics 12, 155-179.
- Lazear, E.P. (1996). Personnel economics. MIT Press, Cambridge.
- Ledyard, J.O. (1995). Public goods: a survey of experimental results. in: Kagel, J.H. and Roth, A.E. The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Nalbantian, H.R. and Schotter, A. (1997). Productivity under group incentives: an experimental study. American Economic Review 87, 314-341.
- Pingle, M. (1995). Imitation versus rationality: an experimental perspective on decision making. The Journal of Socio-Economics 24, 281-315.
- Pingle, M. (1997) Submitting to authority: its effect on decision making. Journal of Economic Psychology 18, 45-68.
- Schotter, A. and Weigelt, K. (1992). Asymmetric tournaments, equal opportunity laws, and affirmative action: some experimental results, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 511-539.
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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706 · see citing works
Relative Feedback Increases Disparities in Effort and Performance in Crowdsourcing Contests
Tsvetkova, M., Müller, S., Vuculescu, O., Ham, H., & Sergeev, R. A. (2022) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3555649 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
- Authors
- van Dijk, F., Sonnemans, J., & van Winden, F.
- Venue
- European Economic Review
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-02
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 187-214
- ISSN
- 0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3122466829
- Cited by
- 281
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 19 · 2013: 17 · 2012: 22
- FWCI
- 25.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
- Keywords
- incentive mechanisms, effort, payment schemes, team production, free-riding, tournaments, relative performance, individual performance, ability differences, employee attitudes, computerized task
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