Checks and balances, and the supply of central bank independence
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Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Multiple veto players in government make it more difficult to reverse a decision to delegate, giving independent central banks greater scope to reduce the inflation bias.
“As we do, they argue that multiple veto players in government make it more difficult to reverse a decision to delegate, giving independent central banks greater scope to reduce the inflation bias.”
From The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy (2003) · cites this paper as Moser (1999)
Cites
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E., & Pagano, M. (1991) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344630 · Cited by 1,585 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
KEEFER, P., & STASAVAGE, D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000777 · Cited by 667 · see citing works
Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability
Quintyn, M. (2003) · CESifo Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/cesifo/49.2.259 · Cited by 216 · see citing works
- Authors
- Moser, P.
- Affiliations
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Moser, Peter
- ORCID
- Moser, Peter
- Venue
- European Economic Review
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1999-08
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1569-1593
- ISSN
- 0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2081844530
- Cited by
- 173
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 9
- FWCI
- 19.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- European Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Keywords
- central bank independence, checks and balances, time consistency, monetary policy credibility, legislative system, bicameralism, veto power, central bank statutes, inflation, political institutions
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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