The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The case for a populist Central Banker
Open accessAbstract
We present a general equilibrium optimizing model in which we study the joint effects of centralization of wage setting and central bank conservatism on economic performance. Several striking conclusions emerge. In relatively centralized labor markets employment and output are decreasing, and inflation is intially increasing and then decreasing, in the degree of central bank conservatism. A radical-populist central banker who cares not at all about inflation (alternatively, who is not conservative) maximizes social welfare. Economic performance is not U-shaped in the degree of centralization of the labor market, in contrast to conventional wisdom.
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Citations
Cites
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rogoff, K. (1985) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885679 · Cited by 3,688
Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence
Alesina, A., & Summers, L. H. (1993) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2077833 · Cited by 1,833
Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries
Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., Malinvaud, E., & Pagano, M. (1991) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344630 · Cited by 1,585
Cited by
An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism
(2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0001 · Cited by 3,083
Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A Reinterpretation of the Welfare State
Estevez‐Abe, M., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0004 · Cited by 1,568
Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:
Cukierman, A., & Lippi, F. (1999) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00128-7 · Cited by 416
Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies
Thelen, K. (2001) · Varieties of Capitalism · doi:10.1093/0199247757.003.0002 · Cited by 344
Metadata
- Authors
- Guzzo, V., & Velasco, A.
- Venue
- European Economic Review
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1999-06
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 1317-1344
- ISSN
- 0014-2921 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2054131302
- Cited by
- 189
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 54.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Guzzo, V., & Velasco, A. (1999). The case for a populist Central Banker. European Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00127-5
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.