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Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development Levy in Tanzania
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Ineffective tax administration is often seen as one of the main constraints on the ability of states to collect revenues in general and direct taxes in particular.
“Ineffective tax administration is often seen as one of the main constraints on the ability of states to collect revenues in general and direct taxes in particular (Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001).”
From Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries (2014) · cites this paper as Fjeldstad and Semboja 2001
The Introduction (page unavailable) reports that other studies link development-levy noncompliance to corruption and administrative failings, and describes improving local authorities’ administrative capacity as a proposed response. The paper also notes limited administrative resources for tax collectors. These passages support administration as a constraint in this Tanzanian case, but do not establish it as one of the main constraints on states’ revenue collection generally or on direct taxes in particular. (LLM, conf=0.83)
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Research works printed but not linked: 19
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- Alm, 1991, Tax base erosion in developing countries, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 39, 849, 10.1086/451912 · DOI
- Andreoni, 1998, Tax compliance, Journal of Economic Literature, XXXV, 818
- Banerjee, 1992, A simple model of herd behaviour, Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVI, 797, 10.2307/2118364 · DOI · Paper page
- Besley, T., Preston, I., & Ridge, M. (1993). Fiscal anarchy in the UK. Modeling poll tax non-compliance. Working Paper W4498. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research · DOI
- Bukurura, 1991, Public participation in financing local development: the case of Tanzanian development levy, Africa Development, 16, 75
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- Cowell, 1988, Unwillingness to pay. Tax evasion and public goods provision, Journal of Public Economics, 36, 305, 10.1016/0047-2727(88)90013-8 · DOI
- Fjeldstad, 2000, Dilemmas of fiscal decentralisation. A study of local government taxation in Tanzania, Forum for Development Studies, 27, 7, 10.1080/08039410.2000.9666122 · DOI · Paper page
- Fjeldstad, 2001, Taxation, coercion and donors. Local government tax enforcement in Tanzania, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39, 289, 10.1017/S0022278X01003627 · DOI
- Graetz, 1986, The tax compliance game: towards and interactive theory of law enforcement, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 38, 1
- Grasmick, 1980, Legal punishment, social disapproval and internalization as inhibitors of illegal behaviour, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 71, 325, 10.2307/1142704 · DOI
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- Richupan, S. (1984). Income tax evasion: a review of the measurement of techniques and some estimates for the developing countries. Departmental Memorandum No. DM/84/46, The International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department, Washington, DC
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Tax And Development: Donor Support To Strengthen Tax Systems In Developing Countries
Fjeldstad, O. (2014) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.1676 · Cited by 96
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Semboja, J.
- Affiliations
- Chr. Michelsen Institute (NO)
- Research on Poverty Alleviation (TZ)
- Corresponding author
- Semboja, Joseph
- ORCID
- Fjeldstad, Odd-helge
- Venue
- World Development
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2001-12
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 2059-2074
- ISSN
- 0305-750X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2008053583
- Cited by
- 224
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 14 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 10
- FWCI
- 13.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- World Development (publishedVersion)
- NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- BIBSYS Brage (BIBSYS (Norway)) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Norges Forskningsråd
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Local Government Finance and Decentralization
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic and Fiscal Studies
- Keywords
- tax compliance, tax evasion, poll tax, local taxation, tax enforcement, public service delivery, tax resistance, Tanzania
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