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The Generality/Specificity of Expertise in Scientific Reasoning
Open accessAbstract
Previous research on scientific reasoning has shown that it involves a diverse set of skills.Yet, little is known about generality or domain specificity of those skills, an important issue in theories of expertise and in attempts to automate scientific reasoning skills.We present a study designed to test what kinds of skills psychologists actually use in designing and interpreting experiments and contrast expertise within a particular research area with general expertise at designing and interpreting experiments.The results suggest that psychologists use many domain-general skills in their experimentation and that bright and motivated Carnegie Mellon undergraduates are missing many of these skills.We believe that these results have important implications for psychological and artificial intelligence models of expertise, as well as educational implications in the domain of science instruction.
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Cited by
Epistemologically authentic inquiry in schools: A theoretical framework for evaluating inquiry tasks
Chinn, C. A., & Malhotra, B. A. (2002) · Science Education · doi:10.1002/sce.10001 · Cited by 1,302
Review of Graph Comprehension Research: Implications for Instruction
Shah, P., & Hoeffner, J. (2002) · Educational Psychology Review · doi:10.1023/a:1013180410169 · Cited by 431
Studies of scientific discovery: Complementary approaches and convergent findings.
Klahr, D., & Simon, H. A. (1999) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.125.5.524 · Cited by 352
McNeill, K. L. (2011) · Journal of Research in Science Teaching · doi:10.1002/tea.20430 · Cited by 254
Gobert, J. D., Sao Pedro, M., Raziuddin, J., & Baker, R. S. (2013) · Journal of the Learning Sciences · doi:10.1080/10508406.2013.837391 · Cited by 210
Metadata
- Authors
- Schunn, C. D., & Anderson, J. R.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999-07-01
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 337-370
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2012329609
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 33.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
