Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
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According to GDPR legal provisions, the data subject must be provided with meaningful information about the logic involved in automatic decision making, commonly referred to as the right to explanation.
“According to these legal provisions, the data subject must be provided with ''meaningful information about the logic involved'' in the automatic decision making process, which is commonly referred to as the ''right to explanation'' [6].”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [6]
Wachter et al. design a generic counterfactual explanation framework to find the closest point to the test data example.
“Wachter et al. design a generic counterfactual explanation framework to find the closest point to the test data example [6].”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [6]
Wachter et al. suggest the use of the Manhattan distance weighted by the inverse median absolute deviation to calculate the proximity of a counterfactual to the input data example.
“The researchers suggest the use of the Manhattan distance weighted by the inverse median absolute deviation to calculate the proximity of a counterfactual to the input data example.”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [6]
In Wachter et al., fixing the optimal set of weights of a trained classifier, the objective function minimizes the distance between the nearest data points of opposing classes.
“Fixing the optimal set of weights of a trained classifier, the objective function minimizes the distance between the nearest data points of opposing classes.”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [6]
Single-sentence textual counterfactual explanations combine a textual description with explicitly stated numerical feature values.
“Single-sentence textual explanations combine a textual description with explicitly stated numerical feature values [6].”
From A Survey of Contrastive and Counterfactual Explanation Generation Methods for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as [6]
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Stepin, I., Alonso, J. M., Catala, A., & Pereira-Farina, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3051315 · Cited by 376 · see citing works
“Aumann limits a counterfactual to be a conditional with a false antecedent only [30].”
Background
- Authors
- Aumann, R. J.
- Affiliations
- Hebrew University of Jerusalem (IL)
- Corresponding author
- Aumann, Robert J.
- ORCID
- Aumann, Robert J.
- Venue
- Games and Economic Behavior
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1995-01
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 6-19
- ISSN
- 0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2075928479
- Cited by
- 588
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 21 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 24 · 2016: 32 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 27 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 24.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Keywords
- backward induction, common knowledge of rationality, rationality, game theory
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