Situating Abstract Concepts
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Roughly speaking, an abstract concept refers to entities that are neither purely physical nor spatially constrained. Such concepts pose a classic problem for theories that ground knowledge in modality-specific systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2003a,b). How could these systems represent a concept like TRUTH ? Abstract concepts also pose a significant problem for traditional theories that represent knowledge with amodal symbols. Surprisingly, few researchers have attempted to specify the content of abstract concepts using feature lists, semantic networks, or frames. It is not enough to say that an amodal node or a pattern of amodal units represents an abstract concept. It is first necessary to specify the concept's content, and then to show that a particular type of representation can express it. Regardless of how one might go about representing TRUTH , its content must be identified. Then the task of identifying how this content is represented can begin. The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the content of three abstract concepts: TRUTH, FREEDOM , and INVENTION . In an exploratory study, their content will be compared to the content of three concrete concepts – BIRD, CAR , and SOFA – and also to three intermediate concepts that seem somewhat concrete but more abstract than typical concrete concepts – COOKING, FARMING , and CARPETING . We will first ask participants to produce properties typically true of these concepts. We will then analyze these properties using two…
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For all abstract categories, when there are no strong perceptual statistical regularities within the category, humans use words as the glue that holds the category together.
“As with all abstract categories, in the absence of strong perceptual statistical regularities within a category, humans use words as the glue that holds the category together (Barsalou & Weimer-Hastings 2005).”
From The brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review (2012) · cites this paper as Barsalou & Weimer-Hastings 2005
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References 51 · Cited by 752
- Authors
- Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K.
- Affiliations
- Emory University (US)
- Northern Illinois University (US)
- Venue
- Grounding Cognition
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2005-01-10
- Pages
- 129-163
- OpenAlex
- W1507509966
- Cited by
- 752
- References
- 51
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 89 · 2023: 30 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 27 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 56 · 2018: 42 · 2017: 53 · 2016: 48 · 2015: 36 · 2014: 30 · 2013: 32 · 2012: 31
- FWCI
- 49.46
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- escholarship.org
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Language and Linguistics › linguistics and terminology studies
- Keywords
- abstract concepts, conceptual content, truth, freedom, inventions, concrete concepts, conceptual representation, semantic networks, feature lists, frames
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