The brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review

A functioning peripheral nervous system is not required for a person to experience a core affective state, provided they have prior experiences that give them central nervous system representations of bodily states.

“A functioning peripheral nervous system is not necessary for a person to experience a core affective state (e.g., Critchley et al. 2001) as long as they have some prior experiences to provide them with central nervous system representations of bodily states.”

• cites Critchley et al. 2001 sourcePartly supported

  The Discussion (page unavailable) says that people with acquired peripheral autonomic failure may avoid major emotional deficits partly because established representations can reduce dependence on direct peripheral feedback. But the study concerns autonomic failure, not loss of a functioning peripheral nervous system altogether; it also identifies intact non-autonomic sensory pathways and other bodily responses as reasons emotional deficits may be limited. Prior experience alone is therefore not established as sufficient. (LLM, conf=0.87)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

The anterior cingulate cortex-sadness hypothesis derives support from prior meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature.

“The ACC-sadness hypothesis, similarly to the OFC-anger hypothesis, derives support from prior meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature (e.g., Murphy et al. 2003; Phan et al. 2002).”

• cites Murphy et al. 2003 sourceSupported
• cites Phan et al. 2002 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

These anatomical connections can explain why anterior midcingulate cortex is part of an intrinsic brain network that shows increased activity when environmental stimuli are personally salient.

“These anatomical connections can explain why the aMCC is part of an intrinsic brain network that shows increased activity when stimuli in the environment are personally salient (Seeley et al. 2007).”

• cites Seeley et al. 2007 sourceSupported

Recent behavioral studies show that categorical perception of discrete emotion is supported by language.

“In locationist accounts, language is thought to be epiphenomenal to discrete emotion (Ekman & Cordano, in press), although recent behavioral studies show that categorical perception of discrete emotion is supported by language (Fugate et al. 2010; Roberson & Davidoff 2000; Roberson et al. 2007).”

• cites Fugate et al. 2010 sourceSupported
• cites Roberson & Davidoff 2000 sourceSupported
• cites Roberson et al. 2007 sourceSupported

Even rats do many things within a single emotion category: in the face of threat, they can freeze, flee, or engage in defensive treading.

“Even rats do many things within a single emotion category: in the face of a threat, rats can freeze (e.g., LeDoux et al. 1990), flee (Vazdarjanova & McGaugh 1998), or engage in “defensive treading,” in which they kick bedding in the direction of a known threat (Reynolds & Berridge 2002; 2003; 2008).”

• cites LeDoux et al. 1990 sourceSupported
• cites Vazdarjanova & McGaugh 1998 sourceSupported
• cites Reynolds & Berridge 2002 sourcePartly supported

  The “GABAergic defensive treading, affect, and fear” section describes rats kicking sand toward targets and building protective mounds, and compares this with natural responses to threats. But it says the treading observed in this study was directed at parts of the chamber in the absence of actual threats, so it does not establish the claim’s specific description of bedding kicked toward a known threat. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Portions of the intrinsic networks for personal salience and executive control appear anatomically similar to brain regions observed in the meta-analyses.

“Portions of the intrinsic networks for “personal salience” (e.g., Seeley et al. 2007) and “executive control” (e.g., Corbetta & Shulman 2002; Seeley et al. 2007) appear anatomically similar to brain regions that we observed within our meta-analyses as well.”

• cites Seeley et al. 2007 sourceSupported
• cites Corbetta & Shulman 2002 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

There is well-documented evidence for anatomical circuitry underlying specific actions in mammals, such as vocalizations, maternal behavior, freezing, startle, attack, and appetitive behavior.

“There is well-documented evidence for the anatomical circuitry underlying specific actions such as vocalizations (Jürgens 2009), maternal behavior (e.g., pup retrieval, grooming, nest building, and nursing; Numan 2007), freezing (Fanselow & Poulos 2005), startle (Davis et al. 2008; Lang et al. 2000), attack (Blanchard & Blanchard 2003) and appetitive behavior (Berridge & Kringelbach 2008; Shultz 2”

• cites Jürgens 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Numan 2007 sourceSupported
• cites Fanselow & Poulos 2005 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Different discrete emotion categories are not distinguished by distinct patterns of peripheral physiology.

“Different discrete emotion categories are not distinguished by distinct patterns of peripheral physiology (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Mauss & Robinson 2009), facial muscle movements (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003), vocal acoustics (Bachorowski & Owren 1995; Barrett 2006a; Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003) or by subcortical circuits in the mammalian brain (”

• cites Cacioppo et al. 2000Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Mauss & Robinson 2009 sourcePartly supported

  The Autonomic Measures of Emotion summary says that evidence for distinct autonomic signatures of discrete emotions has not fared well. But the same section reports that a small set of measures reliably distinguished particular emotion pairs and leaves open whether combinations of measures might show specificity. The claim's categorical wording therefore goes beyond the review. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

An instance of disgust from watching others eat repulsive food involves a different brain state than an instance of disgust from watching surgical operations.

“an instance of disgust that occurs when watching others eat repulsive food involves a different brain state than an instance of disgust that occurs when watching surgical operations (Harrison et al. 2010).”

• cites Harrison et al. 2010 sourceSupported

The meta-analysis produced results compatible with a psychological constructionist framework, in which a network of interacting brain areas involved in basic psychological operations-both emotional and non-emotional-is active during the experience and perception of various discrete emotions.

“Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: a set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.”

The neural reference space for emotion and affect was inductively divided into six distributed functional groups of brain regions that were consistently co-activated across studies, using multidimensional scaling and cluster analyses.

“Supporting a psychological constructionist approach to emotion, we found that the neural reference space for emotion and affect could be inductively parsed into six distributed functional groups of brain regions (i.e., regions consistently co-activated across studies) using a series of multidimensional scaling and cluster analyses (Kober et al. 2008).”

• cites Kober et al. 2008 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

The meta-analysis provided scant support for the idea that each discrete emotion category maps consistently and specifically onto its own distinct brain region.

“Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions.”

Left amygdala activity was more likely to increase when participants perceived fear or experienced disgust than when they perceived or experienced any other emotion category.

“There was more likely to be increased activity in the left amygdala when participants were perceiving instances of fear or experiencing instances of disgust than when perceiving or experiencing any other emotion categories (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

Those amygdala voxels were not functionally specific to fear perception.

“These voxels were not functionally specific for instances of perceiving fear, however.”

Compared with other brain regions, voxels in the right anterior insula showed more consistent activation increases during disgust perception than during perception of any other emotion category.

“Our density analyses revealed that as compared to other brain regions, voxels within the right anterior insula had more consistent increases in activation during instances of disgust perception than during the perception of any other emotion category (Table 1).”

Compared with voxels in other brain regions, orbitofrontal cortex voxels did not show more consistent activation increases during anger experience or perception than during any other emotion category.

“As compared to voxels within other brain regions, voxels within the OFC did not have more consistent increases during instances of anger experience or perception than during any other emotion category.”

Compared with other brain regions, a larger spatial extent of voxels in the left anterior insula showed consistent activation increases during disgust experience than during experience of any other emotion category.

“As compared to other brain regions, a greater spatial extent of voxels within the left anterior insula had consistent increases in activation during instances of disgust experience than during the experience of any other emotion category (Table 1).”

Left anterior insula activity was more likely to increase when participants experienced anger than when they experienced any other emotion category.

“Increased activity in the left anterior insula was more likely when participants were experiencing an instance of anger than when they were experiencing any other emotion category (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

The neural reference space for discrete emotion derived by the authors was similar to the one reported by Kober et al. (2008), even when the analysis was restricted to discrete emotion studies and included 2006-2007 papers.

“Our derived neural reference space for discrete emotion (Fig. 4; Table S3 in supplementary materials, which can be viewed at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs2011002) closely resembles that reported in Kober et al. (2008), even when limiting our analysis to studies of discrete emotion and including papers from 2006–2007.”

• cites Kober et al. (2008) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Compared with voxels in other brain regions, left lateral orbitofrontal cortex voxels showed more consistent activation increases during disgust experience than during other emotion categories.

“Rather, as compared to voxels within other brain regions, voxels within the left lateral OFC had more consistent increases in activation during instances of disgust experience than during the experience of other emotion categories (Table 1).”

Left amygdala activity was likely not to increase when participants focused on their internal state, such as when emotion experience was induced by recalling a personal event and mental imagery.

“There was likely to be no increase in activity in the left amygdala when participants were focusing on their internal state (i.e., when emotion experience was induced via recall of a personal event and mental imagery; Fig. 5; Table S6).”

Fear experience did not produce a consistent activation increase in either amygdala relative to chance expectation in other brain regions.

“Furthermore, instances of fear experience did not show a consistent increase in activation in either amygdala when compared to what would be expected by chance in other regions of the brain.”

Compared with other brain regions, voxels in both amygdalae showed more consistent activation increases during fear perception than during perception of any other emotion category.

“Our density analyses revealed that as compared to other brain regions, voxels within both amygdalae had more consistent increases in activation during instances of fear perception than during the perception of any other emotion category (Table 1).”

Those amygdala voxels were not functionally specific to disgust experience.

“Those voxels were not functionally specific to instances of disgust experience, however (Fig. 6; Fig. S2).”

Chi-square analyses indicated some functional selectivity for disgust experience and perception in the right and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex voxels identified in the density analysis.

“χ2 analyses indicated that there was some functional selectivity for instances of disgust experience and perception in the voxels in the right and and left lateral OFC that were respectively identified in the density analysis.”

Activity in the right and left lateral orbitofrontal cortex was not specific to disgust experience or perception.

“Activity in the right and left lateral OFC was not specific to instances of disgust experience or perception, however (Fig. 6; Fig. S2).”

A non-significant χ2 test indicated that voxels with consistent activation increases during fear perception were equally likely to show increased activity during other emotion categories.

“An insignificant χ2 analysis revealed that the voxels with consistent increases in activation during instances of fear perception were equally likely to have increased activity during instances of other emotion categories”

A non-significant χ2 test showed that this left amygdala voxel was not functionally selective for sadness.

“An insignificant χ2 analysis revealed that this voxel was not functionally selective for instances of sadness, however.”

Logistic regressions showed that increased activity in the left and right lateral orbitofrontal cortex was likely during a range of exteroceptive and interoceptive sensations.

“Additionally, our logistic regressions revealed that increased activity in the left and right lateral OFC was likely when participants were experiencing a range of exteroceptive (auditory stimuli, visual pictures) and interoceptive (experience or perception of high-arousal core affect) sensations (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

Compared with other brain regions, a left amygdala voxel showed more consistent activation increases during sadness perception than during perception of other emotion categories.

“Finally, as compared to other brain regions, a voxel in the left amygdala had more consistent increases in activation during instances of sadness perception than during the perception of other emotion categories (Table 1).”

Logistic regressions showed that increased activity in the left lateral orbitofrontal cortex was more likely during anger experience than during experience of any other emotion category.

“Our logistic regressions revealed that increased activity in the left lateral OFC was more likely when participants were experiencing instances of anger than when they were experiencing instances of any other emotion category (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

Compared with other brain regions, voxels in the bilateral amygdala showed more consistent activation increases during disgust experience than during experience of other emotion categories.

“Yet, as compared to other brain regions, voxels within bilateral amygdala had more consistent increases in activation during instances of disgust experience than during the experience of other emotion categories (Table 1).”

Right anterior insula activity was likely to increase when participants explicitly evaluated their feelings and represented them in awareness.

“Increased activity in the right anterior insula was likely when participants were explicitly evaluating their feelings and representing them in awareness (Fig. 5, Table S6).”

Compared with voxels in other brain regions, right lateral orbitofrontal cortex voxels showed more consistent activation increases during disgust perception than during other emotion categories.

“Voxels within the right lateral OFC, as compared to voxels within other brain regions, had more consistent increases in activation during instances of disgust perception than during the perception of other emotion categories (Table 1).”

Right amygdala activity was likely to increase when participants experienced or perceived any highly arousing emotion category, namely anger, disgust, or fear.

“Increases in activity in the right amygdala were likely when participants were experiencing or perceiving instances of any highly arousing emotion category (i.e., anger, disgust, fear) (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

Logistic regressions showed that during disgust perception, increased activity in the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex was more likely than during perception of any other emotion category.

“Our logistic regressions confirmed that when participants were perceiving an instance of disgust, there was more likely to be increased activity in the right lateral OFC than when participants were perceiving instances of any other emotion category (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

Several emotion categories were associated with consistent activation increases in the medial temporal lobe.

“Several emotion categories were also associated with consistent increases in activation in the MTL (Tables 1 & 2; see Table S6).”

Increased activity in some dorsomedial prefrontal cortex clusters was likely when participants perceived emotion in faces, bodies, or voices.

“Increased activity in some clusters of DMPFC was likely when participants were perceiving emotion in faces, bodies or voices.”

Compared with voxels in other brain regions, a greater spatial extent of anterior midcingulate cortex voxels had consistent activation increases during fear perception than during perception of any other emotion category.

“As compared to voxels within other brain regions, a greater spatial extent of voxels within the aMCC had consistent increases in activation during instances of fear perception than the perception of any other emotion category (Table 1).”

Other dorsomedial prefrontal cortex clusters showed the opposite pattern: during emotion perception, increased dorsomedial prefrontal cortex activity was not likely.

“Other clusters of DMPFC showed an opposite pattern: when participants were perceiving emotion, increased activity in DMPFC was not likely (Table S6).”

Consistent with the psychological constructionist view, nodes within networks supporting language were part of the neural reference space for discrete emotion.

“Consistent with the psychological constructionist view, nodes within networks supporting language were part of the neural reference space for discrete emotion (Fig. 4)”

Compared with voxels in other brain regions, voxels in subgenual, pregenual, and anterior midcingulate cortex did not show more consistent activation increases during sadness experience or perception than during any other emotion category.

“As compared to voxels within other brain regions, voxels within the sACC, pACC and aMCC did not have more consistent increases when participants were experiencing or perceiving instances of sadness than during any other emotion category (Fig. 6).”

Across density analyses and logistic regressions, sadness experience and happiness experience were each associated with relatively greater consistent activation increases in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex areas than other emotion categories.

“For instance, across our density analyses and logistic regressions, we found that instances of the experience of sadness (Tables 1 & 2) and experience of happiness (Table 1) were each associated with relatively greater consistent increases in activation in areas of DMPFC than other emotion categories.”

Logistic regressions showed that increases in subgenual anterior cingulate cortex were likely during cognitive load.

“Our logistic regressions revealed that increases in sACC were likely when participants were engaged in cognitive load (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

Despite general involvement in emotion, there was some functional selectivity for certain emotion categories in hubs within the conceptualization network.

“Despite general involvement in emotion (Fig. 1; Fig. S3), there was some functional selectivity for instances of certain emotion categories in hubs within the conceptualization network.”

Increased left hippocampus activity was likely when participants perceived instances of fear.

“Increased activity in the left hippocampus, on the other hand, was likely to occur when participants were perceiving instances of fear (Table S6).”

Logistic regressions showed that increased dorsomedial prefrontal cortex activity was likely during emotion inductions involving recall and films.

“Consistent with the role of conceptualization in simulating episodic experience (Schacter et al. 2007), our logistic regressions revealed that increased activity in DMPFC was likely when participants were engaging in emotion inductions involving recall and films (Fig. 5).”

• cites Schacter et al. 2007 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Logistic regressions showed that increased right hippocampus activity was likely when participants perceived emotion in a face, body, or voice.

“Our logistic regressions revealed that, as in the DMPFC, increased activity in the right hippocampus was likely to occur when participants were perceiving an instance emotion in a face, body or voice.”

The paper's meta-analytic results showed that regions of the conceptualization network such as dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, medial temporal lobe, and retrosplenial cortex were part of the neural reference space for discrete emotion.

“As we predicted, our meta-analytic results revealed that regions of the conceptualization network such as DMPFC, MTL and retrosplenial cortex (Buckner et al. 2008) were part of the neural reference space for discrete emotion (Fig. 4)8.”

• cites Buckner et al. 2008Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Consistent with a response selection hypothesis of anterior midcingulate cortex function, increased activity in anterior midcingulate cortex was likely during cognitive load.

“Finally, consistent with a response selection hypothesis of aMCC function, increased activity in the aMCC was likely when participants were engaged in cognitive load (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

The anterior temporal lobe and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex had consistent activation increases across studies of discrete emotion.

“In particular, the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) (Fig. 2, Panels A, B, C, green) had consistent increases in activity across studies of discrete emotion.”

Consistent activation increases were observed in brain regions implicated in conceptualization, language, and executive attention.

“we observed consistent increases in activation in the brain regions implicated in conceptualization (simulation of prior episodic experiences), language (representation and retrieval of semantic concepts), and executive attention (volitional attention and working memory)”

Consistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis, nodes within networks supporting executive attention were part of the neural reference space for discrete emotion.

“Consistent with our psychological constructionist hypothesis, nodes within networks supporting executive attention were part of the neural reference space for discrete emotion.”

Increased DLPFC activity occurred when participants evaluated the emotional content of a stimulus.

“Increased activity in the DLPFC occurred when participants evaluated the emotional content of a stimulus.”

All high-arousal emotion categories in the database were unpleasant.

“As all high-arousal emotion categories in our database were unpleasant (e.g., fear, anger, disgust)”

Increased visual cortex activity was likely when visual methods were used.

“increased activity in visual cortex was likely when visual methods were used”

Fear experience, anger perception, and disgust experience were consistently associated with increased activity in visual cortex regions from V2 to visual association cortex.

“instances of fear experience, anger perception, and disgust experience were consistently associated with increased activity in regions of visual cortex ranging from V2 to visual association cortex”

Density analyses revealed that compared with voxels in other brain regions, right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex voxels were more likely to have increased activity during anger perception than during any other emotion category.

“Our density analyses also revealed that as compared to voxels within other brain regions, voxels in the right DLPFC were more likely to have increased activity during instances of anger perception than any other emotion categories (Table 1).”

Increased periaqueductal gray activity did not correspond more to any one emotion category than to another.

“increased activity in the PAG did not correspond to any emotion category more than to another”

Logistic regressions showed that periaqueductal gray activity was likely when participants experienced or perceived any high-arousal emotion category.

“The logistic regressions demonstrated that increased activity in the PAG was likely when participants were experiencing or perceiving an instance of any high-arousal emotion category”

Compared with other brain regions, anterior temporal lobe voxels did not show more consistent activation increases during one emotion category than others.

“As compared to in other brain regions, voxels within the ATL did not have more consistent increases during instances of one emotion category than others (Fig. S3).”

In every case where a brain region showed consistent activation increases during a discrete emotion category, that increase was not specific to the category.

“In all instances in which a brain region showed consistent increases in activation during instances of a discrete emotion category (e.g., the amygdala in instances of fear perception), this increase was not specific to that category”

The most common finding across logistic regressions linked increases in left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex to instances in which participants explicitly paid attention to emotional information.

“The most common finding across our logistic regressions linked increases in the left VLPFC to instances in which participants were explicitly paying attention to emotional information (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

The periaqueductal gray was reliably active within the meta-analytic neural reference space for discrete emotion.

“the PAG was consistently activated within the neural reference space for discrete emotion”

Instances of sadness experience were associated with consistent activation increases in one voxel within the ventral periaqueductal gray.

“instances of the experience of sadness were associated with consistent increases in activation in one voxel within ventral PAG”

The ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex had consistent activation increases across studies of discrete emotion.

“In particular, the VLPFC and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Fig. 2, Panel A orange and striped green/orange) had consistent increases in activity across studies of discrete emotion.”

Increased VLPFC activity occurred when participants focused on affective content of feelings or perceived emotion on another person's face.

“Increased activity in the VLPFC occurred when participants focused on the affective content of feelings or perceived instances of emotion on another person's face.”

Regardless of task, activation in these brain areas was greater during emotion experience or perception than during a neutral control state.

“regardless of the task at hand, activation in these brain areas was greater when participants were experiencing or perceiving an emotion category than when they were experiencing or perceiving in a neutral control state.”

Logistic regressions suggested that increased left anterior temporal lobe activity was more likely during anger experience than during any other emotion category.

“Our logistic regressions suggested that increased activity in the left ATL was more likely when participants were experiencing an instance of anger than any other emotion category, however (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

Increased right anterior temporal lobe activity was likely when participants were evaluating a stimulus.

“Increased activity in the right ATL, on the other hand, was likely when participants were evaluating a stimulus (i.e., determining the emotional meaning of a face, voice, or picture; Table S6).”

The meta-analytic review did not find strong evidence for a locationist hypothesis of brain-emotion correspondence.

“our meta-analytic review did not find strong evidence for a locationist hypothesis of brain–emotion correspondence”

Activity in a separate periaqueductal gray cluster was likely when participants experienced fear.

“activity in a separate cluster of PAG was likely when participants were experiencing instances of fear”

Regions of visual cortex were among the most frequent to appear in the meta-analytic findings.

“regions of visual cortex were some of the most frequent to appear in our meta-analytic findings”

• Also stated in: § 6. Conclusion · plain

  “visual cortex was one of the most frequently activated brain regions in our meta-analysis of discrete emotions”

Increased visual cortex activity was also likely in studies of unpleasant, high-arousal emotions.

“it was also likely in studies of unpleasant, high-arousal emotions”

Increased left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex activity was likely when participants were experiencing or perceiving instances of anger.

“As in other left frontal and temporal areas (see 5.2 The anterior insula, 5.3 The orbitofrontal cortex, 5.6 Anterior temporal lobe and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex),increased activity in the left VLPFC was likely when participants were experiencing or perceiving instances of anger.”

Some brain regions showed functional selectivity for instances of certain emotion categories.

“Some brain regions showed functional selectivity for instances of certain emotion categories”

Increased DMPFC activation was observed when participants perceived emotion on others' faces.

“increased activation in the DMPFC was observed when participants perceived instances of emotion on others’ faces”

Increased ATL activation was observed when participants focused on emotional stimuli.

“Increased activation in the ATL was observed when participants focused on emotional stimuli.”

Consistent with the prediction, increased right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity was likely when participants explicitly evaluated stimuli.

“Consistent with this prediction, increased activity in the right DLPFC was likely when participants were explicitly evaluating stimuli (Fig. 5; Table S6).”

The meta-analysis found no evidence that the periaqueductal gray has functional specificity.

“we did not find evidence of functional specificity for the PAG in our meta-analysis”

Most studies in the database used stimuli and induction techniques that invoke the most typical and even caricatured instances of an emotion category.

“Most studies in our database utilize stimuli and induction techniques that invoke the most typical – and even caricatured – instances of an emotion category.”

The present meta-analytic review demonstrates that emotion categories do not map to discrete brain locales in the human brain.

“The present meta-analytic review adds to this literature by demonstrating that emotion categories do not map to discrete brain locales in the human brain either.”

Even when participants lie still in the scanner, increases in periaqueductal gray activity during emotion are routinely observed.

“even when participants are asked to lie still in a scanner, we still routinely observe increases in PAG activity in emotion.”

The psychological constructionist approach is the first to attempt mapping basic psychological operations onto brain networks that underlie instances of a psychological category like emotion, or its subordinate categories (anger, sadness, fear, disgust, happiness).

“In fact, there are very clear brain hypotheses that develop from a psychological constructionist view (Barrett 2006b), and our psychological constructionist approach is the first that attempts to map basic psychological operations to brain networks that comprise instances of a psychological category such as emotion, or to the subordinate categories of anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and happiness (”

• cites Barrett 2006bNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Barrett 2009aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Kober et al. 2008 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

A psychological constructionist account does not simply reduce emotion to positive or negative affect.

“Because we hypothesize that people make meaning out of their core affective states in context; experiencing them as a part of an emotion, perception, belief, or judgment; a psychological constructionist account does not simply reduce the category of emotion to positive or negative affect (as is often claimed in summaries of “dimensional models of emotion;” e.g. Fontaine et al. 2007; Keltner et al.”

• cites Fontaine et al. 2007 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Keltner et al. 2003Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Those six functional groups can be aligned with the hypothesized psychological operations that were derived from behavioral data.

“These functional groups can be mapped to the hypothesized psychological operations that we derived from behavioral data (e.g., Barrett 2006).”

• cites Barrett 2006Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Core affect is realized in part by visceral control systems that assist organisms in responding to motivationally salient environmental stimuli.

“Core affect is realized, in part, by visceral control systems that help organisms deal with motivationally salient stimuli in the environment.”

All psychological constructionist models include a second basic operation that automatically and effortlessly makes internal sensory cues or their associated affective feelings meaningful.

“All psychological constructionist models include a second basic psychological operation by which internal sensory cues or their associated affective feelings are automatically and effortlessly made meaningful (i.e., experienced as related to or caused by an event or object, usually in the external surroundings).”

• cites Wundt 1897Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Schachter & Singer 1962 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Russell 2003Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The paper's meta-analytic findings contradict the locationist hypothesis that the orbitofrontal cortex is the brain seat of anger.

“Our meta-analytic findings were inconsistent with the locationist hypothesis that the OFC is the brain seat of anger.”

The logistic regression results for the right anterior insula fit the psychological constructionist hypothesis that the insula supports representation of core affective feelings.

“Our logistic regression findings for the right anterior insula were consistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis that the insula supports representation of core affective feelings.”

The orbitofrontal cortex is anatomically well suited to integrate exteroceptive and interoceptive sensory information to guide behavior, given lateral orbitofrontal cortex connections to sensory modalities and medial orbitofrontal cortex connections to visceral control areas.

“With the lateral OFC's connections to sensory modalities (e.g., Barbas 1988; Rolls 1999, see Kringelbach & Rolls 2004) and the medial OFC's connections to areas involved in visceral control (e.g., Carmichael & Price 1995; Eblen & Graybiel 1995; Ongür & Price 1998; 2000; Rempel-Clower & Barbas 1998; see Kringelbach & Rolls 2004 for a review), the OFC is anatomically well suited to perform this role”

• cites Barbas 1988Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Carmichael & Price 1995 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Kringelbach & Rolls 2004Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

In the model, categorization as situated conceptualization is realized in a set of brain regions that reconstitutes prior experiences for present use.

“In our model, categorization in the form of situated conceptualization is realized in a set of brain regions that reconstitutes prior experiences for use in the present.”

These results, together with later findings, suggest that anger instances are linked to increased activity across a broad set of left frontal and temporal lobe areas.

“These findings, along with subsequent findings (see 5.3 The orbitofrontal cortex, 5.6 Anterior temporal lobe and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and 5.7 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) suggest that instances of anger are associated with increased activity in a broad set of areas in the left frontal and temporal lobes.”

The functions of distinct brain areas within the neural reference space are best understood in the context of the other brain areas to which they are connected and in terms of the basic psychological operations they are functionally selective for in a given instance.

“The functions of distinct brain areas within the neural reference space are best understood within the context of the other brain areas to which they are connected (either anatomically or because of the timing and coordination of neural activity) and in terms of the basic psychological operations they are functionally selective for in a given instance.”

It is unclear that aggression is an unambiguous index of the entire category of anger.

“It is far from clear that aggression is an unambiguous index of the entire category of anger, however.”

Because words are partly represented through situated simulations of prior experiences, emotion words are expected to work together with conceptualization when perceivers make meaning of core affective states.

“Because words are in part represented via situated simulations of prior experiences (e.g., Simmons et al. 2008), we expect emotion words to work together with conceptualization when perceivers make meaning of core affective states.”

• cites Simmons et al. 2008 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

For all abstract categories, when there are no strong perceptual statistical regularities within the category, humans use words as the glue that holds the category together.

“As with all abstract categories, in the absence of strong perceptual statistical regularities within a category, humans use words as the glue that holds the category together (Barsalou & Weimer-Hastings 2005).”

• cites Barsalou & Weimer-Hastings 2005 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

When making meaning of core affect, conceptualization draws on prior experiences and perceptions of emotion to realize emotional gestalts that form part of what Edelman called 'the remembered present'.

“When making meaning out of core affect, conceptualization draws on prior experiences and perceptions of emotion to realize the emotional gestalts that make up part of what Edelman calls “the remembered present” (cf. Edelman 1989; see Barrett et al. 2007c; Barrett 2009b).”

• cites Edelman 1989Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Barrett et al. 2007cNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Barrett 2009bNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The right amygdala results also supported a psychological constructionist interpretation.

“Findings for the right amygdala also supported a psychological constructionist view.”

Executive attention helps direct the combination of other psychological operations to produce an emotional gestalt.

“Executive attention helps direct the combination of other psychological operations to produce an emotional gestalt.”

This finding is consistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis that the orbitofrontal cortex plays a more general role in integrating heteromodal sensations.

“This finding is consistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis that OFC plays a more general role in integrating heteromodal sensations.”

Subgenual anterior cingulate cortex has been linked to sadness because of its role in depression.

“The sACC, on the other hand, has been linked to sadness because of its role in depression.”

One human study found that pregenual anterior cingulate cortex lesions, including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, produce hypersensitivity and increased crying at sad events.

“One study in humans found that pACC lesions (including lesions to dorsomedial prefrontal cortex) produce hypersensitivity and an increased tendency to cry at sad events (Hornak et al. 2003).”

• cites Hornak et al. 2003Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

In this view, anterior midcingulate cortex delivers exteroceptive and internal sensory information to direct attention and motor responses.

“In this view, aMCC delivers sources of exteroceptive sensory information (from thalamic projections; Barbas et al. 1991) and internal sensory information (from the insula; Mesulam & Mufson 1982) to direct attention and motor responses (via projections to lateral PFC and the supplementary motor area; e.g., Barbas & Pandya”

• cites Barbas et al. 1991 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Mesulam & Mufson 1982 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

In the authors' view, pregenual and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex, along with adjacent posterior medial orbitofrontal cortex, are cortical sites for visceral regulation that help realize a core affective state during motivated action.

“In our view, the pACC and sACC (along with the adjacent posterior medial OFC) are cortical sites for visceral regulation that help to realize a core affective state during motivated action (Devinksy et al. 1995) (Fig. 2, panel B, light pinks).”

• cites Devinksy et al. 1995Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

These connections also explain why anterior midcingulate cortex resolves action selection during situations involving conflicting sensory information.

“They also explain why the aMCC is responsible for resolving action selection during situations involving conflicting sensory information (e.g., Grindband et al. in press; Milham et al. 2001; Nelson et al. 2003; see Banich 2009; Shackman et al. 2011; van Snellenberg & Wager 2009).”

• cites Milham et al. 2001 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Nelson et al. 2003 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

This finding is consistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis that the conceptualization network is engaged when affective facial behaviors are perceived as emotional.

“This finding is consistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis that the conceptualization network is brought to bear when affective facial behaviors are perceived as emotional.”

One study found that individuals with borderline personality disorder who have lowered baseline lateral orbitofrontal cortex (BA 47) activity are more likely to aggress against others.

“Fewer studies have linked the lateral OFC to aggressive behavior in humans, but one study found that individuals with borderline personality disorder who have lowered baseline lateral OFC (BA 47) activity are more likely to aggress against others (Goyer et al. 1994).”

• cites Goyer et al. 1994Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Logistic regressions indicated that visual cortex activation was not merely a by-product of the methods used.

“Our logistic regressions revealed that activation in visual cortex was not merely a by-product of the methods used.”

The intrinsic networks identified so far resemble the psychological domains hypothesized by a psychological constructionist view.

“the intrinsic networks that have thus far been identified bear resemblance to the psychological domains that are hypothesized by a psychological constructionist view”

• cites Kober et al. 2008 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

In all these instances, periaqueductal gray activity and associated autonomic states are yoked to the action, not to the emotion category.

“In all these instances, PAG activity and the associated autonomic states it produces, are yoked to the action, and not to the emotion category.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Humans do many things during instances of anger, such as yelling, hitting, remaining still, and smiling.

All data in the meta-analysis came from emotion versus neutral contrasts.

“all data in our meta-analysis were derived from emotion versus neutral contrasts”

To date, broad inductive studies of brain organization have not identified intrinsic networks corresponding to the brain regions active during anger, sadness, fear, and other emotion categories.

“To date, however, no such intrinsic networks have been identified in broad inductive studies of such brain organization (e.g., Smith et al. 2009).”

• cites Smith et al. 2009 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Even broad categories such as emotion, cognition, and perception are not respected by the brain.

“Such findings show that even categories such as emotion, cognition, and perception are not respected by the brain”

The meta-analytic findings were relatively more consistent with the psychological operations considered ingredients of emotion.

“Our meta-analytic findings were relatively more consistent with the psychological operations that we have considered ingredients of emotion”

The present findings are consistent with the earlier meta-analysis by Wager and colleagues.

“our present findings are consistent with Wager et al. (2008)”

• cites Wager et al. 2008Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

The idea of neural re-use is consistent with the psychological constructionist model of brain-emotion correspondence.

“the idea of neural re-use (e.g., Anderson 2010) is consistent with the psychological constructionist model of brain–emotion correspondence”

• cites Anderson 2010 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

These cognitive functions play a routine role in constructing experiences and perceptions of emotion.

“suggesting that these more “cognitive” functions play a routine role in constructing experiences and perceptions of emotion”

As a result, a psychological constructionist approach views periaqueductal gray activity as nonspecifically involved in instances of emotion.

“As a result, a psychological constructionist approach views PAG activity as nonspecifically involved in instances of emotion.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: In a psychological construction approach, a given dedicated circuit for a specific behavioral adaptation will be active across a range of emotion categories, and different dedicated circuits within the periaqueductal gray will be active within instances of a single emotion category depending on which behavioral adaptation is more relevant for the immediate context.

Strong locationist interpretations of brain function are unlikely when they seek specificity for psychological categories.

“This makes strong locationist interpretations of brain function unlikely when such interpretations attempt to find specificity for psychological categories”

Activity in these brain regions is integral to producing instances of emotion.

“Activity in these brain regions is therefore integral to producing instances of emotion.”

Even the most highly specialized brain regions contain neurons that participate in different neural assemblies with different functions.

“even the most highly specialized brain regions (e.g., primary visual cortex) contain neurons that participate in different neural assemblies associated with different functions”

• cites Basole et al. 2003 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Experiences or perceptions of unpleasant emotion categories are realized by brain states that include increased visual cortex activity.

“these findings indicate that experiences or perceptions of unpleasant emotion categories are realized by brain states that include increased activity in visual cortex”

Instances of anger experience involve areas throughout the left frontal and temporal lobes.

“Instances of anger experience therefore involve areas throughout the left frontal and temporal lobes (see 5.2 The anterior insula, 5.3 The orbitofrontal cortex, and 5.7 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex).”

The meta-analytic findings largely agree with psychological constructionist models.

“the findings of our meta-analytic review, which are largely in agreement with this approach”

The findings are consistent with the idea that emotion categories are not natural kinds respected by the brain.

“Our findings are consistent with the idea that emotion categories are not natural kinds that are respected by the brain.”

Different discrete emotion categories are not distinguished by distinct patterns of subcortical circuits in the mammalian brain.

“Different discrete emotion categories are not distinguished by distinct patterns of peripheral physiology (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Mauss & Robinson 2009), facial muscle movements (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003), vocal acoustics (Bachorowski & Owren 1995; Barrett 2006a; Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003) or by subcortical circuits in the mammalian brain (”

• cites Barrett 2006aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Barrett et al. 2007aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

A psychological constructionist approach is viable for understanding the brain basis of emotion.

“A psychological constructionist approach is not only a viable approach for understanding the brain basis of emotion”

These findings argue against the criticism that emotions invoked in the scanner are superficial.

“therefore these findings argue against the criticism that emotions invoked in the scanner are superficial.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The periaqueductal gray is necessary for motivated action patterns in animals.

The bulk of the empirical evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that emotions emerge from the interplay of more basic psychological operations.

“we found that the bulk of the empirical evidence is more consistent with the hypothesis that emotions emerge from the interplay of more basic psychological operations.”

Different discrete emotion categories are not distinguished by distinct patterns of facial muscle movements.

“Different discrete emotion categories are not distinguished by distinct patterns of peripheral physiology (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Mauss & Robinson 2009), facial muscle movements (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003), vocal acoustics (Bachorowski & Owren 1995; Barrett 2006a; Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003) or by subcortical circuits in the mammalian brain (”

• cites Cacioppo et al. 2000Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Feeling and seeing might not be as distinct as typically assumed.

“Feeling and seeing might not be as distinct as typically assumed”

Different discrete emotion categories are not distinguished by distinct patterns of vocal acoustics.

“Different discrete emotion categories are not distinguished by distinct patterns of peripheral physiology (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Mauss & Robinson 2009), facial muscle movements (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003), vocal acoustics (Bachorowski & Owren 1995; Barrett 2006a; Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003) or by subcortical circuits in the mammalian brain (”

• cites Bachorowski & Owren 1995 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Barrett 2006aNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Locationist views do not match the scientific evidence in any measurement domain for emotion.

“they do not match the scientific evidence in any measurement domain for emotion.”