On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games
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Abstract
In an ultimatum game, player 1 makes an offer of $ X from a total of $ M to player 2. If player 2 accepts the offer, then player 1 is paid $( M − X ) and player 2 receives $ X ; if player 2 rejects the offer, each gets zero. In the ultimatum game experiments reported in the literature, M is typically not more than $10 (see Forsythe et al., 1994, hereafter FHSS; Hoffman et al., 1994, hereafter HMSS, and the literature cited therein). We report new results for 50 bargaining pairs in which M = $100 and compare them with previous outcomes from 48 pairs with M = $10. The need for an examination of the effect of increased stakes on ultimatum bargaining is suggested by a literature survey of the effect of varying the stakes in a wide variety of decision-making and market experiments over the last 33 years (Smith and Walker, 1993b). Many cases were found in which the predictions of theory were improved when the monetary rewards were increased.There were also cases in which the level of monetary rewards had no effect on the results. Consequently, it is necessary to examine the stakes question on a case-by-case basis. The previously reported effect of instructional changes, which define different institutional contexts, on ultimatum game outcomes, and the effect of stakes reported here, suggest a game formulation that explains changes in the behavior of both players as a result of changes in the instructional treatments. We formulated such a model and indicate how it might be further tested. I. Theory and Previous Results Suppose the payoffs and individual rationality of the players are common knowledge.
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Fairness and the assumptions of economics
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Cited by
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.166 · Cited by 5,378
Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hoffman, E., McCabe, K. A., & Smith, V. L.
- Venue
- Bargaining and Market Behavior
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2000-06-12
- Pages
- 139-151
- OpenAlex
- W2790033079
- Cited by
- 125
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 29.09
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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