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Cited by 1,674Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesGame Theory and Voting SystemsDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics

Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.

Hoffman, Elizabeth, McCabe, Kevin, Shachat, Keith, Smith, Vernon·1994·Games and Economic Behavior
DOI 10.1006/game.1994.1056
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  • Proposers in the contest condition felt self-servingly entitled to a higher payoff, but responders did not view the contest as relevant to the fair division of the pie.

    “It seems that proposers in the contest condition felt self-servingly entitled to a higher payoff, but responders did not view the contest as relevant to the fair division of the pie.”

    From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994

  • In Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994), offers in the contest condition were lower than in the chance condition, and the rejection rate was substantially higher.

    “Offers in the contest condition were lower than in the chance condition, and the rejection rate was substantially higher.”

    From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994

  • Experiments using the ultimatum game have shown that seemingly subtle variations in procedure that should not matter from a strictly economic point of view, such as the mechanism that determines the roles, whether the game is framed as an offer game or a demand game, and the timing and method of eliciting an offer, all have powerful effects on how people play the game.

    “Experiments using the ultimatum game have shown that seemingly subtle variations in procedure that should not matter from a strictly economic point of view-for example, the mechanism that determines the roles, whether the game is framed as an offer game or a demand game, and the timing and method of eliciting an offerall have powerful effects on how people play the game (Blount, 1995;Hoffman, McC”

    From Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases (1997) · cites this paper as Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith, 1994

  • The dictator game was used to assess the convergent validity of the ZPG.

    “To assess the convergent validity of the ZPG, participants played the dictator game [31].”

    From Short-term compassion training increases prosocial behavior in a newly developed prosocial game (2011) · cites this paper as [31]

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Authors
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V.
Affiliations
University of Arizona (US)
ORCID
Venue
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1994-11
Volume
7
Issue
3
Pages
346-380
ISSN
0899-8256 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1006/game.1994.1056
OpenAlex
W2010008813
Cited by
1,674
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 29 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 52 · 2021: 42 · 2020: 65 · 2019: 47 · 2018: 79 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 77 · 2014: 75 · 2013: 103 · 2012: 113
FWCI
76.97
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
Games and Economic Behavior (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
ultimatum game, dictator game, fairness, self-regarding preferences, first-mover advantage, property rights, anonymity, double-blind experiment, expectations, knowledge quiz

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