The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self
Abstract
One of the most striking manifestations of schizophrenia is thought insertion. People suffering from this delusion believe they are not the author of thoughts which they nevertheless own as experiences. It seems that a person's sense of agency and sense of the boundary between mind and world can come apart. Schizophrenia thus vividly demonstrates that self-awareness is a complex construction of the brain. This point is widely appreciated. What is not so widely appreciated is how radically schizophrenia challenges our assumptions about the nature of the self. Most theorists endorse the traditional doctrine of the unity of consciousness , according to which a normal human brain generates a single consciousness at any instant in time. In this chapter we argue that phenomenal consciousness at each instant is actually a multiplicity : an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. We then consider how certain aspects of self might emerge from this manifold substrate, and speculate about the origin of thought insertion. Introduction Schizophrenia is a complex and heterogeneous disease, incorporating at least three distinct subsyndromes: psychomotor poverty (poverty of speech, lack of spontaneous movement, blunting of affect), disorganization (inappropriate affect, disturbances of the form of thought) and reality distortion (Liddle, 1987; Johnstone, 1991). The reality distortion syndrome encompasses the so-called ‘positive’ symptoms of schizophrenia, which include auditory hallucinations, delusions of persecution and delusions of reference. Of these, thought insertion is arguably the most bizarre.
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“Here, the system fails to attribute self-generated outcomes to endogenous rather than exogenous causes, with the phenomenological manifestation to the agent being a perceived loss of agency over their thoughts (Stephens and Graham 1994; O’Brien and Opie 2003; Gallagher 2004).”
From Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution (2021) · cites this paper as O’Brien and Opie 2003
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Deane, G. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab024 · Cited by 38
“Here, the system fails to attribute self-generated outcomes to endogenous rather than exogenous causes, with the phenomenological manifestation to the agent being a perceived loss of agency over their thoughts (Stephens and Graham 1994; O’Brien and Opie 2003; Gallagher 2004).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- O'Brien, G., & Opie, J.
- Venue
- The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2003-08-07
- Pages
- 107-120
- OpenAlex
- W1489706081
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 3.10
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Adelaide Research & Scholarship (AR&S) (University of Adelaide) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- thought insertion, schizophrenia, unity of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, self-awareness, sense of agency, delusions, emergence of the self
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