Cited by 11Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceMental Health and PsychiatryFree Will and Agency

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self

O'Brien, Gerard, Opie, Jonathan·2003·The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry

Abstract

One of the most striking manifestations of schizophrenia is thought insertion. People suffering from this delusion believe they are not the author of thoughts which they nevertheless own as experiences. It seems that a person's sense of agency and sense of the boundary between mind and world can come apart. Schizophrenia thus vividly demonstrates that self-awareness is a complex construction of the brain. This point is widely appreciated. What is not so widely appreciated is how radically schizophrenia challenges our assumptions about the nature of the self. Most theorists endorse the traditional doctrine of the unity of consciousness , according to which a normal human brain generates a single consciousness at any instant in time. In this chapter we argue that phenomenal consciousness at each instant is actually a multiplicity : an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. We then consider how certain aspects of self might emerge from this manifold substrate, and speculate about the origin of thought insertion. Introduction Schizophrenia is a complex and heterogeneous disease, incorporating at least three distinct subsyndromes: psychomotor poverty (poverty of speech, lack of spontaneous movement, blunting of affect), disorganization (inappropriate affect, disturbances of the form of thought) and reality distortion (Liddle, 1987; Johnstone, 1991). The reality distortion syndrome encompasses the so-called ‘positive’ symptoms of schizophrenia, which include auditory hallucinations, delusions of persecution and delusions of reference. Of these, thought insertion is arguably the most bizarre.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1017/cbo9780511543708.006

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 1 references

Research works printed but not linked: 19

  1. Georgieff, N. , & Jeannerod, M. , (1998). Beyond consciousness of external reality: a “who” system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 7, 465–77 · DOI
  2. Smythies, J. R. , (1994). Requiem for the identity theory. Inquiry, 37, 311–29 · DOI
  3. Johnstone, E. C. , (1991). Defining characteristic of schizophrenia. British Journal of Psychiatry, suppl. 13, 5–6
  4. Mellors, C. S. , (1970). First-rank symptoms of schizophrenia. British Journal of Psychiatry, 117, 15–23
  5. Baars, B. J. (1997). In the Theater of Consciousness: The Workspace of the Mind. New York: Oxford University Press
  6. Searle, J. , (2000). Consciousness. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 23, 557–78 · DOI
  7. Baars, B. J. (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  8. O'Brien, G. , & Opie, J. , (2000). Disunity defended: a reply to Bayne. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, 255–63 · DOI
  9. Liddle, P. F. , (1987). The symptoms of chronic schizophrenia: a re-examination of the positive–negative dichotomy. British Journal of Psychiatry, 151, 145–51 · DOI
  10. Bartels, A. & Zeki, S. , (1998). The theory of multi-stage integration in the visual brain. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. B, 265, 2327–32 · DOI
  11. McGurk, H. , & MacDonald, J. , (1976). Hearing lips and seeing voices. Nature, 264, 746–8 · DOI · Paper page
  12. O'Brien, G. , Opie, J. (1998). The disunity of consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 378–95 · DOI
  13. Bayne, T. , (2000). The unity of consciousness: clarification and defence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78, 248–54 · DOI
  14. Graham, G. & Stephens, G. L. (1994). Mind and mine. In Philosophical Psychopathology, ed. G. Graham & G. L. Stephens, pp. 91–109. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
  15. Zeki, S. (1993). A Vision of the Brain. Oxford: Blackwell
  16. Zeki, S. , & Bartels, A. ,(1998). The asynchrony of consciousness. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. B, 265, 1583–5 · DOI
  17. Cleghorn, J. M. & Albert, M. L. (1990). Modular disjunction in schizophrenia: a framework for a pathological psychophysiology. In Recent Advances in Schizophrenia, ed. A. Kales, C. N. Stefanis & J. Talbot, pp. 59–80. New York: Springer Verlag · DOI
  18. Damasio, A. , (1989). Time-locked multiregional retroactivation: a systems-level proposal for the neural substrate of recall and recognition. Cognition, 33, 25–62 · DOI · Paper page
  19. Frith, C. , Rees, G. , & Friston, K. , (1998). Psychosis and the experience of self. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 843, 170–8 · DOI · Paper page

Cited by

Sorted by citations

See all 11

Metadata

Authors
O'Brien, G., & Opie, J.
Venue
The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry
Published
2003-08-07
Pages
107-120
OpenAlex
W1489706081
Cited by
11
References
1
Citations by year
2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2021: 1
FWCI
3.10
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • Adelaide Research & Scholarship (AR&S) (University of Adelaide) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
thought insertion, schizophrenia, unity of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, self-awareness, sense of agency, delusions, emergence of the self

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/cbo9780511543708.006
The paper
O'Brien, G., & Opie, J. (2003). The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self. The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511543708.006