The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets
Abstract
This paper argues that contracts with payment based on a ranking of employee performance can provide performance incentives even under asymmetric information that prevents payment based on individual performance only being enforceable. Such contracts also fit with five features of labor markets that have aroused considerable interest: (1) hierarchical wage structures; (2) internal promotion; (3) wage rates that rise with seniority and experience more than productivity; (4) the variance of earnings increasing with experience; and (5) wage rates attached to jobs rather than individuals with differentials set by administrative procedures rather than by reference to external market wages. Introduction The literature on the principal-agent problem has been concerned with the nature of optimal contracts when there is difficulty in monitoring all aspects of an agent's performance. For the most part, this literature has considered models in which payment based directly on a measure of output provides an enforceable contract. For a recent example, see Grossman and Hart (1983). This requires that information about an agent's output be symmetric so that both parties know what payment is due under the contract and, at least in principle, could get that payment enforced legally if necessary. The output measure does not have to be perfect as long as neither party is in a position to impart a systematic bias to it. However, in many employment situations, information about an agent's output is asymmetric in the sense that the agent cannot verify the principal's observation of it.
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Cites
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization
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Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
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Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
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An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis: With a New Introduction
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A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
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Understanding the employment relation: the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange
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Cited by
Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?
Ehrenberg, R., & Bognanno, M. (1988) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2638 · Cited by 381
Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence
Drago, R., & Garvey, G. T. (1998) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/209880 · Cited by 344
Comparison-concave utility and following behaviour in social and economic settings
Clark, A. E., & Oswald, A. J. (1998) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00064-4 · Cited by 342
The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited: Evidence from the European PGA Tour
Ehrenberg, R. G., & Bognanno, M. L. (1990) · ILR Review · doi:10.1177/001979399004300305 · Cited by 302
Two-Sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts
Kahn, C., & Huberman, G. (1988) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298190 · Cited by 265
Metadata
- Authors
- Malcomson, J. M.
- Venue
- Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 1986-10-31
- Pages
- 157-178
- OpenAlex
- W2017552218
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 53.30
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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